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1. 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper examines in some detail section 320 of the 
Companies Act 1955. That section, which over the years 
has come to be known as the 'fraudulent trading' 
provision (inspite of the fact that it now no longer 
solely refers to fraudulent trading), is one of a group 
of sections in the Act, including sections 311B, 311C, 
315A, 315B, 315C and 364, which requires directors and 
officers to bear the interests of creditors in mind 
when carrying on the business of the company. 
There is no doubt that section 320 imposes upon directors 
and officers a statutory duty of care towards the 
d
. 1 
ere itors. The duty is a statutory one because at 
Common Law, at least until very recently, the courts have 
consistently held that directors did not owe creditors a 
duty of care. The traditional view was recently stated 
as follows: 
" ... apart from statutory obligations to 
take into account the interests of creditors 
... and the general obligation to maintain 
the company's capital, directors are not 
required to have regard to the interests of 
creditors in exercising their responsibilities: 
their concern is with the financial interests 
of the shareholders. 11
2 
The concept of limited liability has always been seen 
. · 1 h h . h 
3 
as a pr1v1 ege rat er tan a rig t. But that privilege 
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has at times been the subject of abuse by directors 
and others in control of a company. Where the loser 
in any particular instance of such abuse was a creditor 
of the company, the directors would, at Common Law, 
be able to get away with their improper conduct. It 
was therefore left to Parliament to intervene, with 
provisions like section 320, by stripping away the 
shield of limited liability and making the delinquent 
directors personally liable for any loss suffered by 
the creditors due to the former's improper acts. 
During the past few years, however, there have been 
certain suggestions in some cases that directors might 
owe creditors a duty of care at Common Law. These 
suggestions have emanated from cases in the 
United Kingdom
4 , Australia
5 and New Zealand.
6 The 
most comprehensive discussion of this issue to date has 
been by Cooke Jin Nicholson v Permakraft (NZ) Ltd.
7 
Cooke J stated the duty by means of an objective test: 
whether, when doing the act which caused loss to 
creditors, the directors should have appreciated or 
ought to have known that their act would cause loss 
to creditors.
8 Cooke J's view, however, is far from 
being prevalent. In the same case both Richardson J 
and Somers J expressly refrained from commenting on 
any such proposition
9 and other judges have continued 
. . . 10 
to reiterate the traditional common law position. 
3. 
For the moment, therefore, one must continue to rely 
on the statutory provisions in imposing a duty upon 
directors in relation to creditors. In this respect 
section 320 is a very important provision. 
Professor Gower, while discussing the section, has 
said: 
"There is no doubt that in practice 
this section represents a potent weapon 
in the hands of creditors which 
exercises a restraining influence on 
over-sanguine directors. The mere 
threat of proceedings under it has been 
known to result in the directors 
agreeing to make themselves personally 
liable for part of the company's debts. 
Of all the exceptions to the rule in 
Salomon's case it is probably the most 
serious attempt which has yet been made 
to protect creditors generally ... from 
the abuses inherent in the rigid 
application of the corporate entity 
concept. 11 11 
With those words in mind, one may proceed to an analysis 
of section 320. 
4 . 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Section 320 was first enacted as section 75 of the 
Companies Act 1928 (UK). The section was enacted 
following a reconunendation of the Greene Conunittee 
on company law
12 that legislation be introduced to 
combat the growing instances of fraudulent trading. 
The Conunittee stated that its attention had been 
"directed particularly to the case (met with principally 
in private companies) where the person in control of 
the company holds a floating charge and, while knowing 
that the company is on the verge of liquidation, 
"fills up" his security by means of goods obtained on 
d . d h 
. . ,.13 ere it an ten appoints a receiver. 
The problem arose primarily in small private companies, 
which were in many instances one-man ventures. The 
primary reason for incorporation was to take advantage 
of the concept of limited liability. The owner could 
sell the proprietorship to the company as a going 
concern for a consideration which might not necessarily 
fl h 1 f h b 
. 14 h 
re ect t e true va ue o t e usiness. Te company 
would therefore take over all the assets and liabilities 
of the owner. If the company satisfied part of the 
purchase price by way of debentures over its 
assets, the owner would himself become a creditor 
of the company. He would in fact become a secured 
5. 
creditor and move a step ahead of the unsecured 
trade creditors, to whom he was previously personally 
liable, and whose remedy, if any, now lay solely with 
the company. In such a situation the owner could 
begin to defraud the trade creditors. It was this 
sort of mischief which the Greene Committee sought 
to overcome, and a classical example of it is 
provided by the facts of the first reported decision 
. 320 ·11 · . h d 15 on section , In re Wi iam C. Leite Bros. Lt . 
In Leitch the respondent incorporated a company and 
sold his business, which he had carried on as a sole 
trader, to it for 5000 pounds. The purchase price 
was satisfied by way of 1000 fully paid o ne pound 
shares and a debenture for 4000 pounds secured by a 
charge over all the assets of the company, present 
and future. The company also took over all the 
liabilities of the proprietorship, amounting to 
770 pounds. 
The accounts at the end of the first two and a half 
years trading showed that the company had made a 
net loss. By the end of the following financial year 
the company was insolvent, with trade creditors being 
owed 6500 pounds. The respondent, however, ordered 
further goods on credit to the value of 6800 pounds. 
This was far in excess of what the company had 
6 • 
normally ordered in previous years over the same 
period. Two months later the respondent appointed 
a receiver. To top things off, the respondent was 
appointed manager by the receiver and drew a salary 
of 1300 pounds before the receiver discovered the 
true affairs of the company and dismissed him. 
The company also had an overdraft with its bank, 
which was guaranteed by the respondent personally. 
During the last three months of trading, the 
respondent had reduced the overdraft almost completely 
by banking all receipts. None of the trade creditors 
was paid at all. A month after going into receivership, 
the company was wound up. 
Prior to the enactment of section 320 the respondent 
would have been paid pursuant to his debenture while 
the trade creditors would have been left high and dry. 
Quite clearly the respondent had acted in an improper 
manner. However, at Common Law he was not liable 
for the debts of the company to the unsecured trade 
creditors, since as director he owed them no duty. 16 
It was this defect which the Greene Committee intended 
to remedy. It recommended that the director in such 
a case should be personally responsible, without 
limitation, for the debts of the company, and any 
security over the company's assets held by him and 
not assigned to a bona fide third party be charged with 
7. 
h 1 . b ' l' 17 t e 1a 1 ity. It was also recommended that the 
director's actions be made a criminal offence. 18
 
The Committee's recommendations were accepted in toto 
by Parliament and enacted as section 75 of the 
1928 Act, which was later consolidated and re-enacted 
as section 275 of the Companies Act 1929 (UK). That 
section was the same as section 320 of the Companies Act 
1955 except that it was limited to directors19 as the 
persons who could be made liable for the company's 
fraudulent acts. A few years later New Zealand 
followed the United Kingdom's example and reproduced 
the fraudulent trading provision as section 268 of 
the Companies Act 1933. 
When the Cohen Committee
20 undertook its review of 
the Companies Act 1929 (UK) it recommended that 
section 275 be amended by replacing the word 'directors' 
with the words 'any persons'. Parliament followed 
that recommendation. Although the Companies Act 1948 (UK)
21 
therefore contained a slightly more liberal fraudulent 
trading provision (section 332), in 1962 the 
Jenkins Committee 22 did not think that the section 
went far enough. It said, in relation to the question 
of fraudulent trading generally: 
8. 
"There is widespread criticism that the 
Companies Act as a whole does not at 
present deal adequately with the 
situation arising from fraud and 
incompetence on the part of directors -
partic~larly
11
~~rectors of insolvent 
companies ... 
The Jenkins Cornrnittee was concerned that a director 
who carried on business in an incompetent manner would 
not be held liable under section 332 when in fact 
his incompetency could lead to loss to creditors to 
the same extent as fraudulent trading could. But 
because the incompetent director may not have had 
an intention to defraud in terms of section 332, 
he would escape liability. Accordingly, the Cornrnittee 
recornrnended that those who carried on the business of 
the company in a reckless manner should be liable, 
without limitation, for all or any of the debts of 
24 
the company. 
Although Parliament has not yet accepted that 
recommendation, it has instead enacted section 15 of 
the Insolvency Act 1985 (UK) which provides that a 
director who "knew or ought to have concluded that 
there was no reasonable prospect that the company would 
avoid going into insolvent liquidation" may be held 
liable, personally, for the debts of the company. 
In New Zealand section 268 of the Companies Act 1933 
was reproduced as section 320 of the Companies Act 1955, 
9 . 
except that, following the United Kingdom's example, 
the word 'directors' was replaced by 'any persons'. 
In 1973 the Macarthur Committee submitted its report 
on the Companies Act. 25 The Committee felt that 
section 320 was too restrictive in scope. It 
recommended the repeal of that section and the 
enactment of a new provision along the lines of 
section 374C(l) of the Companies (Amendment) Act 1971 
(NSW). That section provided that any officer of the 
company who was knowingly a party to the contracting of 
a debt by the company and had, at the time the debt 
was contracted, no reasonable or probable ground of 
expectation of the company paying the debt, was personally 
liable for that debt. This broad provision was in 
addition to liability on the grounds of fraudulent 
trading. 
The Macarthur Committee did not refer to the 
recommendation of the Jenkins Committee in respect of 
reckless ~rading. However, when Parliament came to 
amend section 320, it adopted the recommendations of both 
these committees. In doing so Parliament appeared to 
have been concerned about the risk of loss to creditors 
in the financial climate then prevailing, and was 
seeking to minimise such risk by adopting measures 
introduced in different jurisdictions in relation to 
10. 
that issue as far as possible. 26 
Thus, the Companies Amendment Act 1980 introduced two 
grounds of liability to section 320. The first was 
the contracting of a debt without honestly believing 
on reasonable grounds that the debt would be paid 
(section 320 (1) (a)) and the second was carrying on 
business in a reckless manner (section 320(1) (b)). 
Carrying on business fraudulently was retained as the 
third ground (section 320 (1) (c)). 
27 
In considering each of these grounds of liability, it 
would be more appropriate to deal with fraud first, 
and then to consider the effect of the 1980 amendments, 
since fraud was originally the only basis of liability 
under the section and the 1980 amendments have to 
be considered in the light of the approach which the 
courts have taken in relation to fraud. 
11. 
FRAUD 
Introduction 
The courts have always experienced much difficulty 
in dealing with the issue of fraud in the context 
of section 320. 28 Obviously, the only way of being 
certain of a person's fraudulent intent is an 
admission by him to that effect. Generally such an 
admission will not be forthcoming, either from the 
evidence before or during the trial. The court, 
therefore, has to establish an intent from the facts. 
That difficult task is compounded by the absence of a 
definition, in the Act, of the phrases 'intention to 
29 
defraud' and 'fraudulent purpose'. 
Early Definitions of Fraudulent Trading 
30 
In In re William C. Leitch Bros. Ltd Maugham J 
posed the following test in relation to fraud: 
" ... if a company continues to carry on 
business and to incur debts at a time 
when there is to the knowledge of the 
directors no reasonable prospect of the 
creditors ever receiving payment of 
those debts, it is, in general, a 
proper inference that the company is 
carrying on business with intent to 
defraud creditors. 11 31 
12. 
This test sets a low standard of proof. Even though 
section 320 requires an 'intent' to defraud, it is 
sufficient to establish such intent by inference from 
the fact that the director believed that there was no 
reasonable prospect of the creditors receiving payment. 
One need not actually establish that there was in fact 
a motive to, for instance, order goods on credit and 
not pay for them. Subjective dishonesty need not be 
proved. The test is partly objective, and partly 
subjective in that, although the prospect for payment 
must be objectively ascertained, the director must in 
fact be aware of that prospect. For present purposes, 
the test may be referred to as a liberal test. 
A year later Maugham J had occasion to consider 
section 320 again in In re Patrick and Lyon Ltd.
32 
After referring to Leitch Maugham J said: 
" ... the words 'defraud' and 'fraudulent 
purpose', where they appear in the section 
in question, are words which connote 
actual dishonesty involving, according to 
current notions of fair trading amQng 
corrunercial men, real moral blame. 1133 
Maugham J here is quite clearly adopting a less 
objective approach than he did in Leitch. To establish 
'actual dishonesty' one needs to undertake a subjective 
exercise, which involves a higher standard of proof and 
is overall a more difficult exercise. This is apparent 
from the conclusion reached by Maugham Jon the facts 
13. 
of Patrick and Lyon. The respondent was the major 
shareholder and sole director of a small private 
company. The respondent was also an unsecured creditor 
of the company. He then agreed to advance to the 
company a further loan, which he secured by way of 
debentures constituting floating charges over the 
company's assets. The company then used the new loan 
to discharge the earlier debt to the respondent. 
Six months and one day after the debentures were 
obtained, the respondent placed the company into 
receivership. Two weeks later the company went into 
liquidation. 
The creditors argued that the company was insolvent 
when the debentures were granted and that the only 
reason for carrying on business for the next six months 
was to validate the debentures. 34 That conduct, it was 
argued, clearly constituted an intent to defraud 
creditors. But Maugham J was not so convinced. He 
found the respondent not liable on the basis that 
actual dishonesty had not been proved. 35 
If the Leitch test had been applied to these facts, it 
is arguable that the respondent would have been found 
liable. By taking the loan when the company was 
insolvent, the respondent was incurring a debt when 
there was no reasonable prospect of the company paying 
14. 
that debt. It would therefore appear, and later 
cases have generally accepted, that the tests expressed 
in Leitch and in Patrick and Lyon are irreconciliable. 
This is apparent, for instance, from Hardie v Hanson
36 , 
where the High Court of Australia emphatically rejected 
the Leitch test. Dixon CJ referred to it as being 
much more like an offence under bankruptcy law. He 
said: 
"One may be permitted to doubt whether 
[section 320 J is really aimed at the 
incurring of debts without reasonable 
prospects of payment and perhaps to 
suspect that it was this kind of 
bankruptcy delinquency that influenced 
the expressions used by Maugham J. 11 37 
In Hardie the appellant was director of a company which 
dealt in electrical appliances. The company went into 
liquidation after only two years of trading, during 
which period it had been insolvent. The appellant had 
carried on trading in the hope that with the advent of 
television sales would increase and the company's 
liquidity situation would improve. Unfortunately, as 
Menzies J said, that was simply "an improvident way of 
carrying on business in the hope that something would 
turn up. 1138 
The High Court held that the appellant was not liable 
for fraudulent trading. The court adopted a strict 
15. 
definition of fraud. Dixon CJ said: 
" the intent to defraud creditors 
must be express or actual: nothing 
constructive imputed or implied will 
do• II 39 
Menzies J rejected the objective Leitch test when he 
said: 
" even if the chances of payment of 
all creditors in full were so remote 
that it belonged to the realms of hope 
rather than belief, it seems to me that 
the fault, grievous though it may be, 
falls short of fraud ... 11 40 
The trial judge had found that the appellant had 
withdrawn sums of money from the company while it was 
insolvent and incurring more debts. That finding was 
important in influencing him to the conclusion that 
the appellant was trading fraudulently. In the High 
Court both Dixon CJ and Menzies J rejected that finding 
of fact. Kitto J agreed with the trial judge on the 
facts, but he came to a different conclusion on the 
law. He held that an intent to defraud creditors would 
only be established if it was proved that the appellant 
had "an actual purpose, consciously pursued, of swindling 
creditors out of their money. 1141 It was not enough if 
the appellant simply "acted with blameworthy 
irresponsibility, knowing that he was (in effect) 
gambling with his creditors' money as well as his own, 
and with much more of their money than of his. 1142 
Hence one had to ask what the purpose of the drawings 
16. 
was. That purpose was simply part of a wider scheme 
to try and trade the company out of its difficulties. 
Even though in the circumstances such drawings 
demonstrated the utter wrongness of the appellant's 
actions, they did not evidence an intention to defraud. 
The Leitch test, in Kitto J's opinion, was therefore 
misleading. 
A Distinction between the Hardie and the Patrick and Lyon 
Tests 
The High Court defined fraud in very strict terms. One 
had to ask what the director's purpose actually was in 
carrying on business and engaging in prima facie 
improper acts, such as withdrawing money from the 
company while it was insolvent. The test, therefore, 
was clearly subjective. In reaching its conclusion the 
High Court unequivocally rejected the Leitch test. 
However, it is not entirely clear that by rejecting 
Leitch, the court instead necessarily accepted the 
Patrick and Lyon test. It is true that some subsequent 
cases (as well as certain writers) have tended to treat 
the Patrick and Lyon and Hardie tests as one.
43 
But 
when one examines the judgments in Hardie it is clear 
that none of the judges expressly endorsed the Patrick 
and Lyon test, and in fact used language different from 
that used in Patrick and Lyon in defining fraud. 
17. 
The test in Patrick and Lyon, it will be recalled, 
was "actual dishonesty involving real moral blame". 
Dishonesty, however, is a wide term and covers conduct 
which may not amount to fraud. This is apparent when 
one compares fraud with the concept of recklessness. 
Recklessness, in the sense which it is submitted it 
is used in section 320 (1) (b) 44 , means the conscious 
undertaking of an unjustifiable risk. In Hardie the 
appellant knew that the company was insolvent and that 
there was very little chance of creditors being paid. 
Yet he continued with the company's business rather 
than putting it into liquidation. He was indifferent 
to the possibility that creditors would suffer further 
losses if he continued trading. It is submitted that 
by ignoring the possibility of loss to creditors, the 
appellant was acting with "actual dishonesty involving 
real moral blame". 
The trial judge in Hardie would appear to have come to 
the same conclusion. He pointed out that the appellant 
had twenty years of business experience and, at the 
appropriate stage during the insolvency, he must have 
realised that the company had reached a stage where the 
observance of proper standards of commercial morality 
would have led him to take the normal steps to make the 
remaining assets of the company available for the 
18. 
satisfaction of its debts. 45 In not doing so he had 
acted dishonestly. 
But the High Court did not agree that the appellant's 
conduct amounted to fraud. According to Dixon CJ: 
"The question is not whether he dealt 
in all respects honestly with the 
situation or with all the creditors 
or other persons involved. The question 
is whether he carried on the business 
... during the final period with intent 
to defraud creditors. That question 
cannot, in my opinion, be resolved by 
considering whether he knew of the 
weakness of the company's finances, 
of its lack of capital, of its inability 
to meet its debts as they became due and 
of the poorness of its immediate future 
prospects. 11 46 
The above factors, according to Dixon CJ, were merely 
evidentiary matters. But they could, if taken together 
with certain other factors, give rise to fraud. One 
such factor adverted to by the learned Chief Justice 
was if the appellant had a motive to relieve himself 
"of liabilities or obligations under which otherwise he 
would lie or recoup his position and to do so at the 
expense of, that is to say in fraud of, creditors.
1147 
Menzies J also proceeded along similar lines. He said 
that a remote chance of payment, more in the realms of 
hope rather than belief, would not amount to fraud 
unless it were "coupled with something else, such as 
misrepresentation of the position or an intention to 
use goods purchased on credit for the purposes of 
19. 
dishonest gain, which gives it a fraudulent character. 1148 
According to the High Court, therefore, merely acting 
in a dishonest manner does not necessarily amount to 
fraud. Ordering goods on credit while the company is 
insolvent and knowing that it is unlikely that the 
creditors would be paid is clearly dishonest. However, 
while such conduct may amount to recklessness, 
it does not amount to fraud. To establish fraud one 
would have to show that the goods were ordered with the 
intention of swindling creditors. That may be 
established, for instance, by proving that the appellant 
used the goods to 'fill up' his debenture over the 
company's assets before placing the company into 
receivership. Hardie, therefore, contains a stricter 
test than Patrick and Lyon; it is more subjective and 
requires a higher standard of proof. 
It is submitted that the difference between the Hardie 
and Patrick and Lyon tests is important in New Zealand 
following the introduction of reckless trading as one of 
the two new grounds of liability under section 320.
49 
Since recklessness and fraud exist as two separate 
bases of liability within section 320, the tests in 
respect of them must clearly be different. The Patrick 
and Lyon test, while laid down in relation to fraud, 
is wide enough to cover recklessness without, however, 
20. 
being precise enough to be a proper definition of 
the latter concept. The important question, therefore, 
is what approach the New Zealand courts have taken in 
their interpretation of fraud in terms of section 320. 
The issue was before the Court of Appeal recently in 
50 
the case of Re Nimbus Trawling Co. Ltd. However, on 
previous occasions a few cases in the High Court (and 
the former Supreme Court) had also dealt with the issue. 
The New Zealand Position 
d . 
. d51 
In Re Maney an Sons De Luxe Service Station Lt 
Wild CJ purported to apply the Hardie v Hanson test. 
He found that the respondent was guilty of fraudulent 
trading by appropriating to himself money from the 
company's cash register instead of depositing it to the 
company's bank account. As a consequence of the 
misappropriations the company suffered liquidity problems 
and passed a resolution for voluntary winding up. The 
major loser was the company's principal trade creditor. 
The Chief Justice also found that by not entering the 
receipts in the company's books the respondent had 
caused the company to file false tax returns, which 
constituted a fraud on the revenue, another creditor 
52 
of the company. 
21. 
53 
In Re Casual Capers Ltd Bisson J applied both the 
Patrick and Lyon and Hardie tests, and in doing so 
appears to have treated them as one. The respondent 
operated a retail shop. The company was insolvent due 
to overstocking. The respondent tried to reduce stock 
over the next three months. But at the end of that 
period the company was even more hopelessly insolvent. 
As at that date the company also had a large bank 
overdraft secured by the respondent's personal 
guarantee. The company continued trading for a further 
three months, incurring more substantial trade debts, 
and then went into liquidation. By that time the 
overdraft had been almost completely extinguished. 
Bisson J held that the respondent had not been trading 
fraudulently when she decided to trade the company out 
of its difficulties when it first became insolvent. She 
reduced stock and opened another branch in the hope of 
increasing turnover. It could not be said that she 
was acting with actual dishonesty involving real moral 
blame in terms of Patrick and Lyon. However, three 
months before liquidation it was clear the company's 
position was irretrievable and the respondent should 
have ceased trading. Iler only purpose in not doing so 
was to reduce the bank overdraft and thereby her personal 
liability. She banked all receipts and left trade 
creditors unpaid. Bisson J was satisfied, beyond 
22. 
reasonable doubt, that the respondent had, in terms 
of Kitto J's test in Hardie v Hanson, an actual 
purpose, consciously pursued, of swindling creditors 
our of their money. 
Although Bisson J did not distinguish the two tests, 
that did not make any difference on the facts before 
him. Hardie has a higher standard of proof than 
Patrick and Lyon. It follows from this that if the 
latter test was not satisfied, then a fortiori the 
former test would not have been satisfied. Conversely, 
if the Hardie test was held applicable, it follows 
that applying the Patrick and Lyon test would have 
led to the same conclusion. 
The Court of Appeal recently had occasion to consider 
the question of fraudulent trading in Re Nimbus Trawling 
Co. Ltd. 54 Unfortunately, the court did not delve 
into the issue in any depth. It did not discuss the 
d . ff 1 . d d . . hSS . k d L 1 erent tests ai own in Leite , Patrie an yon 
and Hardie. Cooke P agreed with the finding of 
Prichard Jin the High Court
56 that the respondents 
were liable for fraudulent trading. He accordingly 
also accepted, without question, the Patrick and Lyon 
test which Prichard J had applied viz. "that actual 
dishonesty, morally blameworthy conduct according to 
current notions of fair trading among commercial men, 
23. 
had to be proved 11 •
57 
Somers J, with whom Richardson J agreed on this issue, 
appears to have treated the Patrick and Lyon and Hardie 
tests as one when he said that fraud meant "actual 
d • h 1 f d 1 • II 58 is onesty - actua rau u ent intent. But later he 
appears to have adopted the Hardie test solely when he 
said section 320 was "directed against persons who 
deliberately and knowingly set out to cheat or defraud 
creditors. 11
59 And immediately before those words 
Somers J echoed the words of Kitto Jin Hardie when he 
said section 320 was "not aimed at persons who are 
bl h . . bl h 1 1 · · · 
1160 
amewort y, irresponsi e or even ope ess y optimistic. 
It is submitted that insofar as the Court of Appeal 
adopted different tests as to fraud, it is the strict 
Hardie interpretation which should be preferred. 
Following the 1980 amendment to section 320
61 , that 
section now provides three separate grounds of liability 
for carrying on business in certain circumstances. 
Those grounds attract different standards of proof, 
reflect different degrees of improper conduct and, it 
is submitted, should result in different extents of 
liability. Fraudulent trading attracts not only a 
civil sanction (pursuant to section 320(1)) but also 
a criminal sanction. The combined effects of 
sections 4610(1) and 461E(l) of the Companies Act 1955 
24. 
is that any person found liable for fraudulent trading 
is liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding two years or to a fine not exceeding $1000, 
or both. On the other hand, negligent or reckless 
trading (i.e. a breach of paragraphs (a) and (b) of 
section 320(1)) do not attract a criminal sanction. 
It is submitted that this factor, together with the 
fact that reckless trading must attract liability to 
an extent falling just short of that for fraudulent 
trading, suggests that the standard of proof for fraud 
must be the strict standard as stipulated in Hardie. 
Patrick and Lyon, with its wide test, capable of 
covering both recklessness and fraud, but not being 
precise enough for either, may be safely put to one 
side by the New Zealand courts. 
The United Kingdom Position 
It is of significance to note that the Court of Appeal 
in Nimbus did not refer to the more recent English 
authorities on the question of fraudulent trading. The 
position in England is rather different from that in 
New Zealand and Australia. 
In Re White and Osmond (Parkstone) Ltd 62 Buckley J was 
faced with the apparently irreconcilable tests in 
Leitch and Patrick and Lyon. 
63 In Leitch, as noted above , 
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Maugham J had said that fraud would generally be 
inferred if the company continued to trade when there 
was no reasonable prospect of creditors ever receiving 
payment. In White and Osmond Buckley J attached 
significance to the word 'ever'. He said: 
"In my judgment, there is nothing 
wrong in the fact that directors incur 
credit at a time when, to their 
knowledge, the company is not able to 
meet all its liabilities as they fall 
due. What is manifestly wrong is if 
directors allow a company to incur 
credit at a time when the business is 
being carried on in such circumstances 
that the company will never be able to 
satisfy its creditors. 11 64 
It is arguable whether Maugham J intended to limit his 
words in the manner stated by Buckley J. Nevertheless, 
it has been suggested that Buckley J's application of 
Leitch enables one to reconcile that case with Patrick 
and Lyon, with the important consideration being what 
the directors view of the company's position at the 
65 relevant time was. But that proposition was recently 
rejected, albeit indirectly, by the Court of Appeal in 
R v Grantham. 66 
Grantham was a case on the United Kingdom equivalent 
of section 461D, which imposes criminal liability for 
fraudulent trading. The persons charged in that case 
were accordingly tried before a judge and jury. During 
the course of his summing up the trial judge said that 
if the defendant: 
26. 
"obtains or helps to obtain credit or 
further credit when he knows there is 
good reason for thinking funds will 
become available to pay the debt when 
it becomes due or shortly thereafter 
then ... you might well think that is 
dishonest and there is an intent to 
defraud. 11 6 7 
The defendants appealed on the basis that this 
direction was contrary to both Leitch and White and 
Osmond in that the judge should have directed that 
liability only arises if there is no reasonable prospect 
of the creditors ever receiving payment. But 
Lord Lane CJ, delivering the judgment of the Court of 
Appeal, and obviously referring in particular to the 
first part of the judgment of Buckley J quoted above, 
said: 
"In so far as Buckley J was saying that 
it is never dishonest or fraudulent for 
directors to incur credit at a time 
when, to their knowledge, the company 
is not able to meet all its liabilities 
as they fall due, we would respectfully 
disagree. 116 8 
Although by rejecting the distinction drawn by 
Buckley J the Court of Appeal rejected a construction 
which Maugham J probably never intended, the court also, 
unfortunately, re-introduced the difficulty of 
reconciling the apparently different tests in Leitch and 
Patrick and Lyon, a difficulty which White and Osmond 
had arguably overcome. The question now arises as to 
27. 
what test the Court of Appeal laid down in respect of 
fraudulent trading. The court did not itself state a 
test but merely approved the direction given by the 
trial judge. That direction, it is submitted, is 
based on Leitch. The use of the phrase "when he knows 
there is no good reason for thinking" by the trial 
judge suggests that the test is, like the Leitch test
69 
part:!_y objective and partly subjective: "Objectively, 
there must be no good reason for thinking that funds 
will be available to pay the debt; subjectively, the 
person in question must know there is no good reason.
1170 
It may be noted that the Court of Appeal did not refer 
to Hardie v Hanson 71 and, perhaps more importantly, 
72 
to its own previous decision in~ v Cox,~ v Hodges. 
In the latter case a differently constituted Court of 
Appeal had discussed the question of dishonesty in 
relation to the United Kingdom equivalent of 
section 32 0 ( 1) ( c) . The court had referred to a passage 
73 
in the judgment of Lawton LJ in R v Landy where his 
Lordship had said: 
"The dishonesty to be proved must be 
in the minds and intentions of the 
defendants. It is to their states of 
mind that the jury must direct their 
attention. 11 74 
In~ v Cox,~ v Hodges the Court of Appeal had quite 
clearly stated that dishonesty for the purposes of 
28. 
fraudulent trading had to be established subjectively. 
But the passage from the trial judge's summing up in 
Grantham, referred to above, and which was approved on 
appeal, suggests that dishonesty is simply a matter of 
inference: dishonesty would be inferred once it was 
established that the director had no good reason for 
thinking that the debt would be paid. This is the same 
approach as that in Leitch, where an intent to defraud 
(which according to Patrick and Lyon involves 
dishonesty) could be inferred once it was established 
that the director knew there was no reasonable prospect 
of creditors receiving payment. Inferring dishonesty 
based upon a partly subjective and partly objective 
enquiry into the reasonableness of incurring a debt at 
a particular point in time is quite different from 
actually establishing dishonesty through a purely 
subjective exercise. Grantham, therefore, would appear 
to endorse the liberal Leitch test rather than the 
stricter Patrick and Lyon test. By doing so, however, 
Grantham becomes irreconcilable with R v Cox, R v Hodges. 
The decision in Grantham may clearly be criticised in 
· · 75 h l 't . terms of the test it stipulates. Nevert e ess, i is 
quite clear that the Court of Appeal reached the correct 
decision on the facts. Further, the Grantham test may 
in fact be justified on one particular basis. 
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In Grantham the defendants had formed a company to 
speculate in the potato market. The company ordered 
88000 pounds worth of potatoes from a French supplier. 
However, within a month of the order the potato market 
collapsed. But the defendants continued to sell the 
potatoes, often at below cost price. They paid the 
supplier less than 20000 pounds and kept the rest of 
the proceeds of sale for themselves. Two of the 
defendants were in fact bankrupts. The company did not 
have a sufficient capital base from its inception. 
The scheme of operations quite clearly indicated that 
the defendants never had any intention of paying, or 
otherwise compensating, the French supplier in full. 
Even applying the strict Hardie v Hanson test, it is 
quite clear that the defendants had a conscious purpose 
to cheat the French supplier out of his money. 
Further, when Grantham was decided, fraudulent trading 
was the only basis of liability; Parliament had not 
adopted the recommendation of the Jenkins Committee 
that reckless trading be introduced as a further ground 
Of 1 . b'l' 76 1a 1 1ty. By interpreting the fraudulent trading 
provision liberally, the Court of Appeal broadened the 
scope of the provision to include the case of reckless 
trading, as well as that of negligent trading. But 
following the introduction of section 15 of the 
77 
Insolvency Act 1985 (UK) , the above proposition is no 
30. 
longer tenable. It is submitted, therefore, that the 
Grantham test will need to be re-evaluated soon so as 
to exclude from its scope, at least, the concept of 
negligent trading, which is now expressly provided for 
by section 15. 
Can a Bare Preference amount to Fraud? 
An interesting issue in relation to fraudulent trading 
is whether the bare fact of preferring one creditor to 
another constitutes fraud. That question was answered 
in the negative recently in Re Scarflex Ltd. 78 In that 
case a company had entered into an agreement to supply 
another company, SAFE, with a press. The press 
malfunctioned and a dispute arose between the two 
parties as to the responsibility for this, which 
eventually led to SAFE obtaining judgment against the 
company. Meanwhile the company had passed a resolution 
to cease trading. Over the next two years it collected 
its assets and paid off all debts, including one to the 
parent company which it satisfied by selling to it all 
its fixed assets and stock. No provision was made for 
SAFE's judgment debt, which the company did not have 
sufficient assets to satisfy in any event. 
The liquidator argued that the company had traded with 
intent to defraud a creditor by deliberately ignoring 
31. 
SAFE's claim. But Oliver J rejected that argument. He 
said: 
"What is alleged here - and it is all 
that the liquidator relies upon - is 
the bare fact of preference and ... the 
proposition that that, per se, constitutes 
fraud within the meaning of the section 
is not one which is, in my judgment, 79 arguable with any prospect of success." 
All the transactions entered into by the company, 
including that with its parent, were legitimate business 
transactions, duly recorded in the company's books. In 
the absence of mala fides, a mere preference could not 
amount to fraud. However, Oliver J did not lay down an 
absolute rule. He said that there might be "circumstances 
of a very peculiar nature involving preferential 
payments from which the intention required by [section 320] 
could be inferred 11 • 80 
In Re Nimbus Trawling Co. Ltd81 , although Somers J 
referred to the decision in Scarflex, he left open the 
question whether the case was correctly decided. 
His Honour said that in Nimbus there was "rather more" 
than the bare fact of preferring one creditor over 
another. However, he did not expand on what that 
'rather more' exactly was. With respect, it is difficult 
to see any material difference between the facts of 
Nimbus and Scarflex. 
32. 
In Nimbus NTC, a small private company, operated a 
fishing trawler in conjunction with GFD. The operation 
ceased to be profitable and the major shareholder was 
about to wind the company up when the respondents 
bought him out. Included in the takeover was an 
assignment to the respondents of the benefit of a loan 
account which the company owed to the vendor shareholder. 
The respondents then sold the trawler to GFD and applied 
the proceeds to meet all the company's debts, including 
the loan account to themselves. They then purchased 
with that sum half the shares in GFD. In the meantime 
NTC had had a disputed debt with PVM over repairs to the 
trawler. PVM had obtained judgrnent against NTC. 
However, the respondents completely ignored PVM's claim 
in disposing of the proceeds of sale of the trawler. 
But there was no suggestion that the transactions in 
question were other than bona fide. 
In the High Court Prichard J referred to Oliver J's 
dictum in Scarflex that in some circumstances a preference 
may amount to an intention to defraud. Prichard J 
accordingly distinguished that case on its facts and held 
the respondents liable. But the Court of Appeal, by a 
majority, reversed his decision on the basis the facts 
did not disclose an intention to defraud. It is submitted 
that the Court of Appeal should have followed one of two 
courses of action. It should have either affirmed 
33. 
Prichard J's decision that Scarflex could be distinguished 
on its facts; or it should have followed Scarflex and 
overruled Prichard J. It is submitted that Nimbus is 
as much a bare preference case as was Scarflex, and it 
is difficult to see how the Court of Appeal distinguished 
Scarflex and yet reached the same conclusion as in that 
82 case. 
Difficulty of establishing Fraud 
While the fraudulent trading provision has been in 
existence for over half a century, there appear to have 
been, in fact, relatively few cases under it. The 
major reason for that would appear to be the difficulties 
involved in establishing fraud. 
Those difficulties may be ascertained from the cases 
themselves. Perhaps the most illustrative case is 
Nimbus. In the High Court Prichard J relied on two 
factors in finding the respondents liable: the sale 
of the trawler and the discharge of the loan account. 
Taken against the background of PVM's impending claim, 
that amounted to fraud. In the Court of Appeal Cooke P 
agreed witl1 that conclusion. But Richardson and 
Somers J J thought otherwise. Somers J said that the 
transactions were entered into or contemplated before 
34. 
83 
PVM filed writs against the company. The respondents 
also had a valid counterclaim against PVM and only 
abandoned it on the advice of counsel. The evidence 
was therefore not conclusive of an intention to defraud 
d · . 84 a ere itor, to wit PVM. 
85 In In re Patrick and Lyon Ltd the respondent appeared 
tohave deliberately set out to convert his unsecured 
debt into a secured one. But Maugham J was not entirely 
satisfied that the respondent had acted fraudulently 
even though six months and one day after obtaining his 
security he placed the company into receivership. It 
may be noted that there is, in this respect, a suggestion 
in the judgment that merely because the respondent did 
not purchase goods on credit to 'fill up' his debenture, 
as was the case in 
86 
In Re William C.Leitch Bras.Ltd, 
he was not liable for fraudulent trading. It is submitted 
that insofar as Maugham J thought that section 320 was 
only directed towards the Leitch type of case, he was in 
error. It is quite clear that the intention behind the 
enactment of section 320 was to deal with all forms of 
fraudulent trading, of which the Leitch type of case was 
87 
the predominant example. 
Re Day - Nite Carriers Ltd88 was also a difficult case. 
It was, in fact, similar to Nimbus in that there was a 
disposition of the company's assets by the respondent 
35. 
in anticipation of a judgment for a liquidated sum and 
enforcement proceedings thereon. The company had a 
disputed debt with CSI Ltd, which eventually obtained 
judgment. The company intended to appeal, but in the 
meantime a winding up order was presented in respect of
 
the company. By that stage the respondent had withdrawn 
from the company by way of salary all available cash. 
White J held that the respondent's actions had come 
11 close to the borderline 
II but did not quite amoi_-m t to 
fraud for the purposes of SP-ction 320. 
It is quite difficult, therefore, to say with any degre
e 
of certainty as to what conduct would amount to fraudul
ent 
trading. The standard of proof is fairly high. It w
as 
difficulties such as these which led to the amendment o
f 
section 320 in 1980. The broadening of section 320 m
eans 
that in some of the cases decided under the former 
section 320 the respondent might be held liable for 
negligent or reckless trading when previously he had be
en 
absolved of liability for fraudulent trading. For inst
ance, 
B 9 . l l f kl t d. 
9 O 
Hardie v Hanson is c ear y a case o rec ess ra 1ng
. 
The appellant there knew that there was a possibility o
f 
loss to creditors, but he ignored that and carried on 
trading in the vain hope that he would salvage the comp
any 
from insolvency. 
of creditors. 
lie completely disregarded the interests 
36. 
It would be appropriate, therefore, to turn to the 
1980 amendment to section 320 and to the two new 
grounds of liability introduced thereby. 
37. 
THE 1980 AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 320 
Introduction 
Two new grounds of liability were introduced into 
section 320 by section 32 of the Companies Amendment 
Act 1980. The first is stated as paragraph (a) of 
subsection (1) of section 320 and provides that an 
officer of the company who was knowingly a party to 
the contracting of a debt by the company and did not 
then honestly believe on reasonable grounds that the 
debt would be paid, is liable for that debt. The 
second ground is contained in paragraph (b) of 
subsection (1) and provides that an officer who is 
knowingly a party to the carrying on of any business 
recklessly is liable for debts so incurred by the 
company. The original ground of liability based on 
fraudulent trading is now reproduced as paragraph (c)!
1 
Preliminary Issues 
The first point which may be noted is that insofar as 
the potential respondent to a section 320 application 
is concerned paragraphs (a) and (b) are more restrictive 
in scope than paragraph (c). While paragraph (c) refers 
to 'any person' who was trading fraudulently, 
paragraphs (a) and (b) refer to 'any person ... while an 
38. 
officer of the company' who was trading negligently or 
recklessly. While paragraph (b) is based on a 
d t . f l k. C . 
92 h · · recommen a ion o t1e Jen ins ommittee , t e restriction 
mentioned in fact was counter to the recommendation of 
that committee, which had said that section 320 should 
be extended to make "directors and others" liable for 
kl d
. 9 3 
rec ess tra ing. 
The implications of the difference in language between 
paragraph (c) on the one hand and paragraphs (a) and (b) 
on the other is quite clear. Parliament must be taken 
to have regarded fraud as a more serious offence. It was 
not only the officers 94 of the company, but any person 
. . d . f d d. 95 who might have been involve in rau ulent tra ing , who 
could be held personally liable to an unlimited extent. 
h h h f 1
. 9 6 kl But were t e c arge was one o neg igent or rec ess 
trading, then the problem was not seen to be so serious 
as to warrant persons other than the officers of the 
company being made liable. This conclusion may be 
supported by the fact that it is fraudulent trading only 
which attracts a criminal sanction pursuant to section 461D, 
besides the civil liability under section 320 itself.
97 
The second point which may be noted is that the 1980 
amendment merely introduced the two new grounds of 
liability. It did not alter section 320 in any other way, 
and in particular it did not alter the form or substance 
39. 
of the fraudulent trading limb of the section. 
Accordingly, the cases decided under section 320 prior 
to its amendment, and as discussed above
98
, are equally 
applicable to paragraph (c) of subsection (1) of 
section 320 as it now stands. 
There is, however, a suggestion by Vautier Jin the 
recent case of Re Southmall Hardware Ltd
99 
that the 
position might be different. The liquidator there had 
relied upon section 320(1) (c) and argued that the test 
for fraudulent trading was that stated in In re 
. 11 · C . , d 100 W1 1am . Le1tcn Bros. Lt. Vautier J appears to 
have accepted that proposition when he said that 
paragraph (c) "effectively restores the test propounded 
in In re William C. Leitch Bros. Ltd 11 •
101 
But his Honour 
went on to hold that the case fell to be decided under 
the former section 320 102 and the test under that 
· · h t d b ·t · a· 103 provision wast a state y K1 to Jin Har 1e v Hanson. 
These remarks of Vautier J suggest that there has been a 
substantive change in the meaning of fraudulent trading 
following the 1980 amendments, and it would follow that 
the earlier cases dealing with the former section 320 
are no longer applicable; the test under paragraph (c) 
of section 320(1) now being that stated in Leitch. It 
is submitted, with respect, that his Honour was clearly 
in error. There is no difference in the phraseology of 
40. 
paragraph (c) following the amendments. Further, it 
is submitted that the Leitch test is now incorporated 
into paragraph (a) of section 320(1)
104 and if Vautier J 
were correct then that provision would be redundant. 
Paragraph (c), therefore, must be taken to reflect the 
test as stated in Hardie v Hanson. 
Contracting Debts Without An Honest Belief On Reasonable 
Grounds That They Would Be Paid 
Introduction 
As has been noted previously, the Macarthur Committee 
recommended that section 320(1) be amended to include 
a second ground of liability in terms of section 374C(l) 
of the Companies (Amendment) Act 1971 (NSW). 
374C(l) provided: 
If an officer of a company to which 
this section applies was knowingly 
a party to the contracting of a debt 
by the company and had at the time 
the debt was contracted no reasonable 
or probable grounds of expectation, 
after taking into consideration the 
other liabilities, if any, of the 
company at the time, of the company 
being able to pay the debt, the 
officer is guilty of an offence 
against this Act.105 
Section 
One of the reasons for the introduction of this ground 
of liability was the restrictive interpretation of fraud 
41. 
given by the High Court of Australia in Hardie v Hanson. 106 
In 1980 Parliament adopted the Macarthur Corrunittee's 
recorrunendation and enacted paragraph (a) of section 
320(1) .
107 
Paragraph (a), although slightly different in 
form from the Australian provision, would not appear in 
fact to be any different in substance. This will become 
apparent from the following discussion. 
Honest belief on reasonable grounds 
Perhaps the most important aspect of section 320(1) (a) 
is that to escape liability the officer must have 
contracted debts on a two-fold basis: he must have had 
an honest belief that the debt would be paid, and that 
belief must have been based on reasonable grounds. The 
test to ascertain the belief is clearly a subjective 
108 one. It is what the officer actually believed that 
is important, and not what he ought to have believed in 
the circumstances. However, the test as to what are 
reasonable grounds, it is submitted, must be an objective 
one. It is not what the particular officer believed, 
honestly or otherwise, were reasonable grounds, but what 
the ordinary prudent officer in the circumstances would 
have believed were reasonable grounds. This interpretation 
is in accord with the interpretation of the phrase 'no 
reasonable or probable ground of expectation' in 
42. 
section 374C(l) of the Australian legislation. Section 
320 (1) (a) would appear to be a codification of the 
judicial interpretation of the Australian phrase. 
The leading case on the Australian phrase is Shapowloff 
109 
v. Dunn. The defendant argued that 'no reasonable 
or probable ground of expectation' involved a purely 
subjective test. The High Court of Australia, affirming 
the decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal, 
rejected that argument. Wilson J, with whom Gibbs CJ, 
Stephen, Murphy and Aicken JJ agreed, said that it must 
be shown that: 
" ... at the time of contracting the debt 
the defendant himself had no expectation, 
reasonably grounded in the whole of the 
circumstances then existent as he knew 
them, of being able to pay the debt. 
It will be seen that the test involves 
a blending of subjective and objective 
considerations. The test of reason 
imports an objective standard, but it is 
to be applied to the facts as known to 
the defendant. 11 110 
And later Wilson J continued: 
"The defendant himself cannot be the 
arbiter of the reasonableness or 
otherwise of an expectation that he 
would be able to meet the debt. However, 
it is a question of his expectation, and 
whether that expectation is objectively 
reasonable. 11 111 
The phrase 'no reasonable or probable ground of expectation', 
far from being subjective is, it is submitted, prima facie 
an objective test.
112 But whether objective or subjective, 
the phrase has been interpreted as involving both those 
43. 
elements. The use of the words 'honest belief' in 
section 320 (1) (a) codifies that interpretation. The 
approach under this section, therefore, is as follows. 
The officer must in fact believe that the debt would be 
paid. That belief must be based on reasonable grounds. 
But those grounds are not grounds as someone else would 
have seen as existing, but grounds which the particular 
officer in question was aware of. However, in evaluating 
the validity of those grounds, it is not the subjective 
interpretation of the particular officer, but the 
objective assessment of a reasonable officer in the 
circumstances, which is of relevance. In other words, 
one must consider the issue as a reasonable person in 
the officer's position would. 
It is quite clear that in order to prevent liability 
under section 320 (1) (a) one must have both an honest 
belief and reasonable grounds for holding that belief. 
In Dunn v Shapowloff Mahoney JA, in the Court of Appeal, 
stated that if a defendant did have a subjective 
expectation, he would still be liable if there were no 
reasonable grounds for that expectation. If the defendant 
did not advert to the question of reasonable grounds at 
all, or if having adverted to it he subjectively had no 
expectation of payment, then he would still be liable if 
in fact objectively there were no reasonable grounds for 
. 113 any expectation. 
44. 
The question arises whether, if in fact there were 
reasonable grounds for an expectation, the defendant 
would escape liability if he either did not advert to 
the question of expectation at all, or if having done so, 
he decided there was no expectation of payment. The 
language used by Mahoney JA is open to an interpretation 
that the defendant would escape liability. But while the 
language of section 374C(l) may be open to that 
interpretation, it is submitted that section 320 (1) (a) 
is not. The latter provision does not merely refer to 
a ground of expectation, but to an honest belief as well. 
In section 320 (1) (a) the honest belief and the grounds 
for that belief are independent criteria and both are a 
prerequisite for preventing liability. Hence, even if 
there are in fact reasonable grounds for the belief that 
the company would be able to pay the debt, the defendant 
is still liable if in fact he does not hold such a belief. 
Contracting of a debt 
Before a person is liable under section 32 0 ( 1) ( a) , he 
must have been party to the 'contracting of a debt' by 
the company. In most cases the debts of a company are 
easily ascertainable. But there might be difficulties 
in certain cases, and in particular the issue arises 
whether 'debt' includes future and contingent debts. 
45. 
It may be argued that since Parliament did not expressly 
refer to future and contingent debts in relation to the 
word 'debt' where it first occurs in paragraph (a), but 
did so in relation to where it last occurs in that 
paragraph, Parliament intended not to impose liability 
where future or contingent debts were contracted. It is 
submitted, however, that the correct position is to the 
contrary. The very fact that the officer is required to 
assess the company's ability to pay future and contingent 
debts must mean that such debts were in fact created at 
some earlier point in time. Parliament could not have 
intended that officers need not, when contracting such 
future or contingent debts, consider the company's 
ability to pay those debts when they fell due for payment 
but that the officers be required to do so in respect of 
all other debts. It is submitted that any such 
distinction is difficult to uphold in principle; it 
would simply impose an undesirable restriction on the 
scope of paragraph (a). 
This conclusion may be supported by the interpretation 
of the phrase 'contracting of a debt' in section 374C(l) 
in Shapowloff v Dunn. In that case a company, while 
insolvent, placed an order with its sharebrokers for the 
purchase of certain speculative shares. It was agreed 
that the company would pay the purchase price when the 
4 6. 
brokers for the vendors tendered the scrip to the 
company's brokers. The shares were duly purchased, 
but the company soon went into liquidation and an 
action was brought against the director pursuant to 
section 374C(l). At the hearing, however, it was 
not proved that the scrip had actually been delivered. 
The defendant, therefore, argued that since that 
condition had not been fulfilled, there was nothing 
'contracted', and even if there was, what was contracted 
was not a 'debt'. 
That argument was rejected by both the Court of Appeal 
and the High Court of Australia. In the High Court 
Stephen J, with whom Gibbs CJ, Murphy and Aicken JJ 
agreed, said: 
"On that day [ie the purchase date] the 
broker began and completed the execution 
of the company's buying order and the 
company became liable to indemnify the 
broker for the purchase of the shares. 
That liability was contingent, as was 
the broker's liability to the selling 
broker, the contingency in both cases 
being the delivery of the scrip by the 
selling broker. But such a contingent 
liability falls within section 374C(l) 
and is enough to constitute a debt 
falling within that section~ll 4 
The reasons for that interpretation were stated more 
fully by Mahoney JA in the Court of Appeal. He said 
that the relevant inquiry must be made at the time the 
47. 
agreement was initially entered into. Later events 
which may prevent the complete performance of the 
contract could not detract from the fact that the contract 
had in fact been entered into. 
Mahoney JA said: 
By way of example, 
" the fact that, following the 
contracting of a debt by a company, 
the contract came to an end because 
the commencement of its winding up 
prevented the property being tendered 
or otherwise the conditions being 
fulfilled, would not, in my opinion, 
have been a fact intended by the 
legislature to render the section 
inapplicable; I think the intention 
was to the contrary. 11 115 
It is submitted, with respect, that the foregoing applies 
equally to section 320 (1) (a). If the facts of Shapowloff 
v Dunn were to arise in New Zealand today, the case 
would be decided no differently from the way the High 
Court did. 
Able to pay the debt ... As well as all its other debts 
In order to prevent liability under section 320(1) (a) 
the officer must believe, at the time of contracting the 
debt, that the company would be 'able to pay the debt' 
in question, 'as well as all its other debts (including 
future and contingent debts).' The two phrases in 
question are interelated and it would be convenient to 
consider them together. 
48. 
In~ v Shapowloff Mahoney JA said that ability to 
pay did not mean merely whether the company was solvent 
or whether in an instant liquidation it would have 
sufficient assets to meet all liabilities. The 
determination of that issue instead involved a number 
of factors such as the nature of the assets and 
liabilities and of the circumstances of the company's 
business; 
the cash available; promises to provide 
financial assistance by loan, subscription for share 
capital or the provision of a guarantee. 
In determining 
the cash available, it would be relevant to consider 
whether the company could pay by borrowing, whether it 
would be able to realise its assets and at what price 
and whether the transactions involved in paying the 
debt might be voidable, for example for being in breach 
of trust.
116 
Conversely, as both Reynolds JA and Mahoney JA recognised, 
it was not a prerequisite in establishing liability for 
the applicant to prove, in Reynolds JA' s words: 
"that at the date in question the 
liabilities of the company exceeded its 
assets. By way of example, a 
director may have knowledge of what 
has happened or is likely to have 
happened which will bear upon the 
company's capacity to pay the debt 
in question, notwithstanding its 
present insolvency ... 
11
117 
49. 
Quite clearly then a wide range of factors must be 
taken into account in establishing whether the company 
was, at the relevant time, able to pay its debts. The 
necessity for that is quite obvious given the various 
activities different companies may engage in. A company 
speculating in shares may have the value of its assets 
reduced by half if the share market were to suddenly 
take a tumble. The factors to be considered when 
determining such a company's ability to pay would be 
different from those in respect of an ordinary 
merchandise company. At the end of the day the question 
must be considered "in a realistic way by reference to 
h f f h . l 
,.118 t e acts o t e part1cu ar case. 
The phrase 'as well as all its other debts', as it 
appears in section 320(1) (a) is, it is submitted, 
ambiguous. It is capable of two interpretations. It 
may mean that the officer must believe, at the time of 
contracting the debt, that the company would be able to 
pay that particular debt and all its other debts at the 
time when that particular debt becomes due and payable. 
Alternatively, it may mean that the officer must, at 
the time of contracting the debt, believe first that 
the company would be able to pay that particular debt 
when it became due and owing, and secondly that the 
company would be able to pay all its other debts as and 
when each of those debts becomes due and owing. 
50. 
It is submitted that the second interpretation above 
is the preferable one. A company may have a long term 
debt, such as a mortgage, on its books. It may then 
purchase stock on credit, payable in one month's time. 
At the time of purchase the company may be in no doubt 
that it would be able to discharge the long term debt 
when it became due and owing. The company may be 
equally certain of its ability to pay for the goods in 
a month's time. Such a situation is a typical example 
of businessmen operating on a long term basis. Payment 
of the future debt here may depend on some factor, not 
yet in existence perhaps, but quite independent of the 
company's ability to pay the purchase price incurred 
during its normal trading activities. Conversely, the 
existence of the mortgage (leaving aside the question 
of interest payments) would not normally affect the 
ability to pay the purchase price. 
Accordingly, it would be unreasonable to make the 
satisfaction of one debt dependent on the other. That 
is what the first interpretation discussed above would 
lead to and hence, it is submitted, that interpretation 
is incorrect. It would be unreasonable to expect the 
company, at the time of purchasing the stock, to be 
able to discharge the mortgage in a month's time when 
that is not the expectation on anybody's part due to 
the very nature of that debt. The trade creditor 
51. 
himself would not refuse to extend credit even if he 
knew the company was in no position to discharge the 
mortgage at the same time as his debt became payable. 
If the company were then to suddenly experience 
difficulties, it would be unreasonable to make an 
officer of the company personally liable to the trade 
creditor. The second interpretation above leads to a 
more practical and reasonable result. At the time of 
purc~asing the stock, the officer may have been certain 
that the goods would be paid for in a month's time, and 
that the mortgage would be satisfied when it became due 
and payable. The incurring of the one debt is 
independent of the ability to pay the other. The 
company has the ability to pay both debts. 
There are, however, no hard and fast rules. Like the 
interpretation of the phrase 'able to pay the debt', 
the interpretation of 'as well as all its other debts' 
must depend on the facts of particular cases. If, for 
instance, in the above example, the company also had 
another major debt payable in five weeks from the date 
it purchased the stock on a month's credit, and the 
officer was not quite certain whether the company would 
have sufficient funds to meet the two debts within a 
week of each other, then it cannot be said that, at 
the date of purchase of the stock, there were reasonable 
52. 
grounds for an honest belief that the company would 
be able to pay each debt as it became due and owing. 
Reintroduction of the Leitch test 
119 It has been suggested that section 320 (1) (a) 
incorporates or reproduces the test for fraud as stated 
in In re William C.Leitch Bros. Ltd. 120 It was said 
there that carrying on business and incurring credit 
"when there is to the knowledge of the directors no 
reasonable prospect" of payment would amount to 
fraudulent trading. Section 320 (1) (a) states that 
an officer is liable if he does not "honestly believe 
on reasonable grounds" that the debt would be paid 
when it becomes due. That latter phrase, as discussed 
above, is a partly objective and partly subjective 
test. d . d . l 121 . l And that, as iscusse previous y , is a so 
the case with the Leitch formulation. In both cases 
the issue must be considered from the perspective of 
a reasonable person in the officer's position, 
considering the facts as known to that officer. 
Recklessness 
Introduction 
Paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of section 320 provides 
53. 
that any officer of the company who is knowingly a party 
to the carrying on of any business of the company in a 
reckless manner may be personally liable for all the 
debts of the company. That provision, as noted above, 
was introduced in 1980 to broaden the scope of 
. 320 122 1 · section . Reck essness is a concept more commonly 
associated with criminal law. It is not surprising, 
therefore, to find that in the only reported decision 
to date on this section, the court relied heavily on 
the leading decisions in the area of criminal law. 
Thompson v Innes 
123 In Thompson v Innes a company was incorporated for 
the purpose of dealing in industrial supplies, but just 
over two years later, in November 1983, it went into 
voluntary liquidation. The two respondents were the 
sole shareholders and directors of the company. During 
the two years ending March 1983 the company made a 
slight loss of $1200. But between then and November 
there was a net loss of $32700 while trade creditors 
during the same period increased by $40000. Over that 
period the company, against the advice of its accountants, 
continued to increase its operating costs by purchasing 
another car and hiring a computer. On 30 June the 
company obtained an increase in its overdraft from 
$7000 to $12000. At that stage the company was already 
in sol ven·t. 
L'\W U:JRARY 
VICTORIA WJIVC:RSITY OF Vv'ELLINGTOf'.l. 
54. 
On these facts the liquidator argued that the 
respondents should have ceased trading on 30 June 
since there was no hope of trading the company out 
of its difficulties and creditors were clearly being 
exposed to great risk. But Bisson J rejected the 
charge of reckless trading as from 30 June, and held 
that the respondents were only liable as from the 
end of September. When the overdraft was increased, 
the respondents were trying to trade the company out 
of its difficulties with the help of their accountant 
and that did not amount to reckless trading. 
Bisson J first considered recklessness in the context 
of paragraphs (a) and (c) of subsection (1) of 
section 320 and said: 
"In the field of directorship responsibilty 
for carrying on the business of the company 
within the shield of limited liability I see 
in those three paragraphs a gradation of 
conduct sufficiently blameworthy to piece 
that shield and to render a director 
[liable]~ 124 
By 'gradation of conduct' Bisson J is referring to 
the different levels of improper conduct which are 
caught by section 320, each requiring a different 
standard of proof and attracting different levels of 
1 . b ' l't 125 ia ii y. 
Bisson J held that the test in respect of paragraph (b) 
55. 
was an objective one. He first referred to a dictum 
of Lord Hailsham LC's in R v Lawrence
126 that, in a 
legal context, "the state of mind described as 
'reckless' is discussed in connection with conduct 
127 
objectively blameworthy as well as dangerous." 
Bisson J then drew a distinction between the element 
of dishonesty present in paragraphs (a) and (c) of 
section 320(1), and the absence of it from paragraph (b), 
and held that recklessness did not necessarily involve 
blameworthy behaviour to the extent of dishonesty. 
In doing so Bisson J had relied on the decision in 
R v Bates
128 where Donovan J was faced with a section 
similar to section 320(1) in that it contained three 
categories of liability. Donovan J there defined 
recklessness as carelessness. His Lordship said that 
in the context of the statute before him, recklessness 
did not amount to something approaching dishonesty. 
It simply carried its ordinary meaning of carelessness, 
and there was nothing in the section before him which 
. d . h . 12 9 d. 1 prevented him from a opting tat meaning. Accor ing y, 
although Bisson J does not specifically say so, it may be 
concluded that in his Honour's opinion, recklessness in 
the context of section 320(1) (b) means mere carelessness. 
This proposition may be supported by reference to a 
dictum of Lord Diplock's in~ v Lawrence, a case on which 
Bisson J placed much reliance. Lord Diplock had said that 
56. 
reckless carried its popular or dictionary meaning 
of careless, regardless or heedless of the possible 
harmful consequences of one's acts. 130 
Having concluded that section 320(1) (b) contained 
an objective test, Bisson J proceeded to adopt a 
131 
dictum of Lord Diplock's in~ v Lawrence , and 
basing himself on that dictum, formulated the test 
for recklessness as follows: 
"Was there something in the financial 
position of this company which would 
draw the attention of an ordinary 
prudent director to the real possibility 
not so slight to be a negligible risk, 
that his continuing to carry on the 
business of the company would cause the 
kind of serious loss to the creditors 
of the company which section 320 (1) (b) 
was intended to prevent? 11 132 
A number of points may be noted about this test. The 
yardstick of measurement is the ordinary prudent 
director in the position of the respondent officer 
in the circumstances existing at the relevant moment. 
The possibility of loss to creditors has to be a real 
possibility, as perceived by the reasonable officer. 
If there is simply a negligible possibility of loss 
then it may be safely disregarded. But what exactly 
amounts to a 'real possibility' and what is merely a 
'negligible risk' are issues left untouched by Bisson J. 
These, or similar, expressions occur in relation to 
57. 
recklessness in the context of criminal law as we11
133 
and it is generally accepted that the degree of risk 
in each case is a matter of weighing up various factors 
. 1 t . t th f t f t' t t · 1 
134 
in re a ion o e ac so na par icu ar case. 
Presumably, such will be the situation in relation to 
section 320 (1) (b) as well. 
The degree of risk does not matter if the potential 
loss to a creditor is not a 'serious loss' of the type 
contemplated by section 320(1) (b). Again, what amounts 
to a 'serious loss' is probably a matter to be decided 
on the facts of each particular case. To an extent, 
it may be said that the concluding words of Bisson J's 
test begs the question in that one may ask what sort of 
loss was section 320 (1) (b) actually intended to prevent. 
It is arguable whether liability for reckless trading 
should only arise if the possible loss to creditors 
was a serious loss. There is no indication that 
Parliament intended to qualify the section in any such 
manner. A creditor who suffers loss due to an officer's 
reckless trading should be entitled to relief; whether 
the loss suffered was serious or not should not matter. 
While the possibility of loss may be qualified by onJ· 
making a real possibility of loss subject to li , · 
once such a real possibility is establishP -
question of the amount of loss which ma 
be irrelevant. Such a further qualificat 
..ng 
58. 
b 
. tt d . . t h . . . 135 su mi e , is agains t e intention of the section. 
Applying the test to the facts before him, Bisson J 
held that the two respondents were liable for reckless 
trading as from the end of September 1983. Although 
his Honour agreed that the company was insolvent since 
June, he rejected the liquidator's argument that 
liability should attach as from that date. According 
to Bisson J, while continued trading could be seen as 
reasonable up till the end of September, from then it 
would have been quite clear to an ordinary prudent 
director that to continue trading would result in 
serious loss to the creditors. 
Even though in Thompson v Innes recklessness was held 
to import an objective test, the actual application of 
that test causes, or is likely to cause, as much 
difficulty as the application of the subjective test 
for fraudulent trading. This is apparent from 
Thompson v Innes itself. In reaching his conclusion 
Bisson J relied on the fact that the budgeted figure 
for sales for the July - September period was down 
substantially, while creditors over the same period 
had increased dramatically. However, the company was 
insolvent, sales were falling and creditors were 
increasing well before September, and an ordinary 
prudent director may well have decided to cease trading 
59. 
h 1
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muc ear ier. The point at which to draw the line, 
therefore, may well be an open question and, if necessary, 
the benefit of the doubt is given to the respondents. 
Further, ceasing business at an earlier point in time 
may not necessarily be of benefit to creditors. As 
Bisson J recognised: 
"When to call a halt is not an easy 
decision for any director and there 
is a natural reluctance to approaching 
cre~ito:s as.it m~y precipitate a 137 
panic situation with worse consequences." 
Although these difficulties may exist, the consequences 
of calling a halt at an earlier or later point in time 
may be quite significant. The liquidator, alleging 
that the respondents were trading recklessly as from 
the end of June, sought an order against them for $50000, 
being the debts incurred between then and the date of 
winding up. Bisson J, however, in finding the respondents 
liable as from the end of September, made an order in the 
sum of $25000 only. Quite clearly, if liability had been 
held to have arisen any earlier, the amount of the order 
would have been larger. 
Does Thompson v Innes correctly state the test under 
paragraph (b)? 
Being the first, and to date only, decision on 
60. 
section 320 (1) (b), the question naturally arises 
whether Thompson v Innes states the correct test in 
relation to recklessness as it appears in that section. 
The question may be best considered by comparing the 
three different tests in respect of paragraphs (a), 
(b) and (c) of section 320(1). 
The concept of fraud may be distinguished from 
recklessness quite easily. To establish an intent 
to defraud in terms of paragraph (c) one must prove 
a subjective intention to consciously swindle creditors 
out of their money. Recklessness is established if, 
objectively, the officer should have appreciated the 
risk of loss to creditors if the company continued to 
carry on business, but in fact did not do so. Similarly, 
fraud may be easily distinguished from the contracting 
of a debt without an honest belief on reasonable grounds 
that the debt would be paid. One is liable on the latter 
ground if there is no reasonable basis, from an objective 
point of view, for holding the belief that the debt would 
be paid. 
Since fraudulent trading imports a purely subjective 
test, the issue is whether there is any material 
difference between the two objective tests in respect 
of paragraphs (a) and (b). Under paragraph (b) the 
intention of the offic er is irrelevant. Liability is 
61. 
established if the ordinary prudent officer in those 
circumstances would have recognised the real possibility 
of serious loss to creditors. Under paragraph (a), 
while an honest belief is required, that belief counts 
for nought unless it is based on reasonable grounds, 
and what constitutes reasonable grounds is determined 
from the perspective of the ordinary reasonable officer 
in those circumstances. The exercise under paragraph (a) 
is basically to determine whether there were reasonable 
grounds for thinking the company would have the ability 
to pay. The exercise under paragraph (b) is essentially 
to establish whether there were reasonable grounds for 
thinking the creditors would not suffer loss. But these 
two propositions are in fact two sides of the same coin; 
there is no material difference between them. It is 
submitted, therefore, that the tests in respect of 
paragraphs (a) and (b) of section 320(1) are the same. 
This conclusion may be supported by the argument that 
the concept of contracting a debt without reasonable 
grounds for a belief as to payment is simply an instance 
of the wider concept of recklessness. It was submitted 
to the South African Commission of Inquiry into the 
Companies Act that the Act should expressly prohibit 
the carrying on of business in insolvent circumstances 
and the carrying on of business while liability exceeded 
assets. 
In dealing with this submission the Commission said: 
62. 
"It may be argued, however, that these 
instances would invariably be elements 
of contracting debts without a reasonable 
expectation of paying for them; that 
recklessness is a wide concept which 
would include that offence; and therefore 
if the principle of recklessness is 
imported into the section, these specific 
cases would automatically be included. 11 138 
Consequently, the South African equivalent of section 320 
was amended to make reckless trading a second ground of 
liability, in addition to fraudulent trading. 139 
The question now arises whether, notwithstanding the 
foregoing discussion, the test laid down in Thompson v 
Innes should stand. The answer, it is submitted, is 
no. It is significant to note that both the Australian 
and the South African Companies Acts have, besides 
fraudulent trading, either the equivalent of paragraph (a) 
or of paragraph (b) as the alternative basis of liability, 
but not both. In the United Kingdom the Jenkins 
C · 14 O 1 d d th t kl b orrun1ttee on y recorrunen e a rec essness e 
introduced as the second ground of liability; it did 
not refer to the contracting of debts without reasonable 
grounds for a belief as to payment. In New Zealand the 
latter ground only was the basis of the Macarthur 
141 Corrunittee's Report; that Corrunittee did not refer to 
recklessness. However, Parliament decided to introduce 
both those grounds as two separate bases of liability to 
broaden the scope of section 320. It must be presumed, 
therefore, that Parliament intended them to mean different 
63. 
things. However, the tests in respect of paragraphs (a) 
and (b} suggest that there is no material difference 
between those two grounds, and if that position 
is accepted it follows that one of paragraphs (a) and 
(b) is redundant. It is submitted, however, that effect 
should be given to Parliament's intention and hence the 
test in respect of reckless trading should be different 
from that stated in Thompson v Innes. 
It is submitted, with respect, that the problems in 
Thompson v Innes arise from two factors: the reliance 
placed by Bisson Jon the criminal law cases dealing 
with recklessness, and a failure to fully consider the 
meaning of recklessness within the overall context of 
section 320. As noted above, Bisson J relied on 
R v Bates where Donovan J held that recklessness, as 
it appeared in the statute before him, did not necessarily 
1 d . h t 142 connote actua is ones y. But it must be realised 
that Donovan J was, as he himsel f was at pains to point 
out, confining his corrunents to the particular statute 
before him, and was interpreting recklessness in the 
. l 143 context of that particu ar statute. R v Bates is, 
therefore, clearly distinguishable. 
Bisson J also relied on the two leading cases of 
144 145 h' h d f ' R v Caldwell and R v Lawrence w ic , e ine 
recklessness in the area of criminal law. But those 
64. 
cases have been much criticised as having introduced 
confusion into the area of recklessness in criminal 
1 
146 
aw. Prior to those cases, a clear distinction was 
drawn between recklessness and negligence. 
distinction has been explained thus: 
"Recklessness was the conscious 
undertaking of an unjustifiable risk, 
negligence the inadvertant taking of 
This 
an unjustifiable risk. If D was 
aware of the risk and decided to take 
it, he was reckless; if he was unaware 
of the risk, but ought to have been 
aware of it, he was negligent. 11 147 
If this approach is applied then, in order to prove 
recklessness, one must establish that the officer in 
fact was aware of the risk but ignored it; and that 
involves a subjective exercise. If he was not aware 
of the risk at all, but an ordinary prudent officer 
in his position would have been, then he is merely 
negligent. That, it will be observed, is the position 
expressly under paragraph (a) of section 320(1). That 
paragraph refers to the need for having 'reasonable 
grounds' for holding a belief. No such phrase occurs 
in paragraph (b), which simply refers to 'reckless' .
148 
A subjective test for recklessness would not amount to 
the test for fraud. To be fraudulent, the director must 
have consciously pursued a course of conduct with the 
149 
intention of cheating creditors out of their money. 
But recklessness does not require any such intention, 
65. 
what is required is simply a deliberate disregard for 
the interests of the creditors. The distinction may 
be illustrated by reference to Hardie v Hanson150 , 
th f t f 1 . h 1 b t t d . 1 151 e ac so w 1c 1ave een s a e previous y. 
The defendant there was held not to have been liable 
for fraudulent trading because he did not have any 
intention, consciously pursued, of swindling creditors 
out of their money. However, he was clearly aware of 
the risk of loss to creditors but ignored it in the 
vain hope that the company's liquidity situation 
would improve. 
reckless. 
Such conduct, it is submitted, is 
It is submitted that the foregoing discussion leads 
one to draw a clear distinction between the three 
grounds of liability stipulated in section 320(1) 
Those grounds may be sununarised in these terms: 
paragraph (a) imposes liability for negligent trading; 
paragraph (b) for reckless trading; and paragraph (c) 
for fraudulent trading. That analysis would truly 
result in what Bisson J appropriately described as 
"a gradation of conduct" represented by section 320(1). 
Each paragraph reflects improper conduct to a different 
degree; each requires a different standard of proof; 
and each should result in different extents of liability.
152 
66. 
OTHER ISSUES WITHIN PARAGRAPHS (a), (b) AND (c) 
Introduction 
So far the discussion of section 320(1) has concentrated 
specifically on the particular basis of liability under 
each of paragraphs (a), (b) and (c). Each of these 
bases is different from the other. There are, however, 
certain words and phrases which are common to two or 
all of the three paragraphs. 'Knowingly' and 'party to' 
are common to all three paragraphs while 'carrying on 
business' occurs in paragraphs (b) and (c). These 
three expressions have given rise to some difficulties 
in interpretation, and each will now be considered 
individually. 
Party To 
In order to incur liability under section 320(1), one 
need not have actually done any of the activities 
stated therein; it is sufficient to incur liability 
if one has merely been a 'party to' the doing of one 
of those acts. The issue arises as to what sort of 
activity or what extent of involvement is required 
before a person may be held to have been a party to 
those acts. 
67. 
These issues arose squarely in Re Maidstone Buildings 
. . d 153 Provisions Lt . The liquidator sought orders 
pursuant to the United Kingdom equivalent of 
section 320 (1) (c} against the company's directors 
and secretary. The company had carried on business 
while it was insolvent. The directors pruned overheads, 
including their salaries, but the position did not 
improve. Meanwhile the company continued purchasing 
goods on credit. The respondent was secretary of 
the company for much of that period. Ee was in fact 
a partner in a firm of accountants who were the company's 
auditors, and acted as secretary at the company's request. 
He also acted, to some extent, as financial adviser to 
the company. 
The liquidator argued that by virtue of his position, 
the respondent owed a duty to the company to give it 
certain advice viz to cease the business of the company 
so as to prevent loss to the creditors. A failure to 
do that made him a party to the carrying on of the 
business of the company in a fraudulent manner. But 
Pennycuick V-C rejected that argument. He held that 
mere silence and omission to give advice did not amount 
to being a party to the carrying on of business. His 
Lordship adopted the ordinary meaning of the phrase and 
said: 
68. 
" so far as I can see, the expression 
'party to' must on its natural meaning 
indicate no more than 'participate in', 
'take part in' or 'concur in'. And that, 
it seems to me, involves some positive 
steps of some nature. I do not think 
it can be said that someone is party to 
carrying on a business if he takes no 
positive steps at a11. 11 l54 
The respondent did not actually take any part in the 
running of the business; that was confined to the 
directors. His position as secretary was only a nominal 
one. His only failure was not to advise the directors 
to cease business on the basis the company was 
hopelessly insolvent. Such an omission did not make 
h ' t t th I b ' ' ' ' 155 im a par y o e company s usiness activities. 
Positive st~p 
Prima facie, it may be inferred from Pennycuick V-C's 
opinion, as stated above, that if the respondent had 
in fact tendered advice to the company, he would have 
taken a 'positive step' and therefore been a party to 
the carrying on of business. It is submitted, however, 
that such an inference does not necessarily mean that 
the respondent would be liable under the section, since 
to be liable, he must not only have been a party to the 
carrying on of business, but he must have been party to 
the carrying on of business with intent to defraud 
creditors. The above inference overlooks the important 
question of what type of advice the respondent might 
69. 
have tendered to the company. It is submitted that 
the respondent would only be liable if he had advised 
the company to continue trading; 
had been to cease trading. 
and not if his advice 
While Pennycuick V-C did not specifically address the 
issue, it is submitted that he did not intend to rule 
out any such distinction. The definition stated by 
his Lordship was 'participate in', 'take part in' and 
'concur in ' . These phrases, and the last one in 
particular, suggest that the respondent, to be liable, 
must have agreed to the business being carried on. 
156 
This proposition is supported by Thompson v Innes. 
The charge there was one of reckless trading. During 
the period that the respondents were alleged to have 
traded recklessly, they had been advised by their 
accountant in an active, positive manner. But that 
advice was to curb expenditure and to take other 
stringent steps in an attempt to prevent liquidation. 
The advice was, unfortunately, ignored by the respondents. 
Bisson J applied Re Maidstone Buildings Provisions Ltd 
and held that the accountant was not a party to the 
carrying on of the business in a reckless manner. 
Although the accountant, by giving the advice, had 
acted positively, one also had to consider the nature 
of that advice and the overall level of his involvement 
. , b . 157 in the company s us1ness. 
70. 
Pennycuick V-C emphasised that the respondent must 
have taken some 'positive step' in the running of the 
business before he could be said to be a party to it. 
However, what exactly would amount to such a positive 
step is a matter of some doubt and difficulty. It may 
mean active participation in or contribution to the 
management of the business; or it could mean somet~ing 
less direct. Perhaps it was difficulties such as these 
which led to the positive step approach not being 
expressly adopted in Re Gerald Cooper Chemicals Ltd. 158 
Knowledge 
The respondents in Gerald Cooper had agreed to provide 
a company with 150000 pounds to enable it to start production 
of indigo. The company agreed to repay that sum in 
three months' time, together with certain sums from out 
of profits at a future date. But within four months 
of receiving the payment the company was insolvent. 
The respondents knew this and agreed to defer repayment of 
the 150000 pounds for a further ten days. No payment 
was made at the end of that period either. The company 
then entered into a contract with the appellant whereby 
it received an advance payment in return for a promise 
to deliver to the appellant a supply of indigo in two 
months' time. As soon as the company received the 
payment, it paid it to the respondents in discharge of 
71. 
the original debt. 
Templeman J had no difficulty in holding the respondents 
were parties to the fraudulent trading of the company 
even though they had no power of management or control 
over the company's business, and did not themselves 
assist in carrying on that business. The respondents 
knew that the company was insolvent, and the only 
way it could raise finance was by purported forward 
sales of indigo. Hence when the money became available, 
the respondents knew that if they pressed for payment, 
some particular creditor would not receive its indigo 
because without that money, the company could not have 
produced any indigo in the first place. No doubt the 
company traded fraudulently, and by accepting the money 
the respondents were a party to that fraud. 
Templeman J drew a distinction between two possible 
courses of action available to a creditor in the 
respondents' position. He first said: 
"[A] lender who presses for payment is 
not party to a fraud merely because he 
knows no money will be available to pay 
him if the debtor remains honest".159 
However, 
"[A] creditor is party to the carrying 
on of a business with intent to defraud 
creditors if he accepts money which he 
knows full well has in fact been 
procurred by carrying on the business 
with intent to defraud creditors for the 
very purpose of making the payment.
11
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72. 
The respondents, therefore, could have pressed for 
payment, but once the company was in a position to 
discharge the debt, the respondents were not entitled 
to accept any payment from the company. What, if any, 
remedy did they then have? According to Templeman J, 
"The honest debtor is free to be made bankrupt. 11161 
Therefore, if the company had not accepted the advance 
payment, the respondents could have wound up the 
company. But they would have realised little, if 
anything, from out of such a winding up. If the 
respondents had been unaware of the company's business 
activities, then of course they could not have been a 
party to the company's fraud. Further, it is submitted 
that if the company had actually started to manufacture 
the indigo, and the respondents had then presented an 
ultimatum for payment, any payments then made to the 
respondents could not have been impugned. The company 
in this case would not have perpetrated a fraud on the 
appellant; the payment would have been a normal 
response to avoid a winding up by a creditor. In such 
a case, though, the company's officers may be liable 
for reckless or negligent trading, although the 
respondents themselves would not be parties to such a 
charge. The ratio of Gerald Cooper may therefore be 
rested on the fact that the company intended to, and 
did, defraud the appellants for the benefit of the 
respondents and the respondents, being aware of that 
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fact, accepted the benefit conferred on them. It is 
submitted that if the ratio is expressed in any wider 
terms, a general duty of care would be created on the 
part of one creditor towards another; and that may 
be an onerous and undesirable consequence. A creditor 
should generally be allowed to receive what is his due 
entitlement. He should not be required to sacrifice 
his interest for the interests of other creditors. 
It is only if, like the respondents in Gerald Cooper, 
he has acted in an improper manner should he be made 
liable for the fraud, recklessness or negligence of 
another. 
Definition of 'party to' following Maidstone and 
Gerald Cooper 
The two cases considered above suggest that the 
definition of 'party to' comprises two elements. First 
the respondent must commit an act, and thereby take a 
positive step, in relation to the carrying on of the 
business. Secondly, he must do so with the knowledge 
that the particular transaction is effected, or the 
business of the company is being carried on, in a 
negligent, reckless or fraudulent manner. In Gerald 
Cooper the second element was present and, although 
Templeman J did not refer to a positive step, the 
receipt of the payment by the respondents may be taken 
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to have amounted to the positive step. In Maidstone 
the respondent arguably had knowledge of the company's 
fraudulent trading, but he did not act positively in 
the carrying on of the business. His was a failure 
or omission to act and that did not constitute a 
positive step. 
A third ingredient in the definition 
In the discussion above the liability of persons parties 
to fraudulent, reckless or negligent trading has 
depended on the fact that the principal company, ie 
the company now in liquidation, had itself engaged in 
such trading. Thus in Gerald Cooper there was no 
suggestion that the company which took the advance 
payment order was not trading fraudulently
162 
while 
in Maidstone a charge of fraudulent trading had in 
fact been laid against the directors of the company.
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The question arises whether the respondents in either 
case may have been held liable as parties to fraudulent 
trading if the principal company itself had not been 
held to have, or not been alleged to have, traded 
fraudulently. In the recent case of Re Augustus Barnett 
164 · d · h and Son Ltd that question was answere in t e 
negative. 
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In that case a charge pursuant to the United Kingdom 
equivalent of section 320 (1) (c) was laid against the 
parent company (Rumasa) of the company which had gone 
into liquidation (the company). Throughout Rumasa's 
period of control the company had a substantial 
deficiency of assets. The auditors refused to certify 
the accounts without an assurance from Rumasa that it 
would continue to support the company. Rumasa 
accordingly provided letters of comfort for three 
consecutive years, and by 1981 it had injected 4 million pounds 
in subsidies. But a year later the company had a 
deficiency in working capital. The directors advised 
Rumasa that unless further funds were injected the 
company would have to go into receivership to avoid a 
charge of fraudulent trading. Rumasa provided further 
funds and a senior official of Rumasa assured everyone 
that the company would continue to receive funds. 
However, two months later Rumasa reneged on its promise 
and the company went into voluntary liquidation. 
The liquidator alleged that Rumasa's letters of comfort, 
subsidies and continued promises, in particular to 
creditors, to support the company while it was insolvent 
induced creditors to continue supplying goods and made 
Rurnasa a party to fraudulent trading. There was no 
charge of fraud against the directors themselves. In 
rejecting the liquidator's arguments Hoffmann J made 
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two points. He first said that the section unequivocally 
required a finding that someone had done some act which 
was a carrying on of business, and in doing so had 
acted with intent to defraud creditors, before it could 
be said that a third party was a party to such conduct. 
Since no fraudulent intent was alleged against the 
directors, there were no fraudulent acts to which 
Rumasa could be a party. Secondly, Hoffmann J stated 
that the third party's (the respondent's) own state 
of mind was an irrelevant consideration. The phrase 
'with intent to defraud creditors', upon this 
interpretation, therefore, refers back to the words 
'the carrying on of any business of the company' and 
not to the words 'any person was knowingly a party to'. 
On the facts of Augustus Barnett it did not matter 
whether Rumasa itself in fact had an intention to 
defraud the company's creditors; since the directors 
themselves had no such intention the intention and acts 
f 
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Assuming that the decision in Augustus Barnett as stated 
above is a correct interpretation of paragraph (c), 
the question arises whether tne same interpretation 
would apply in relation to paragraphs (a) and (b). 
Generally the issue that arose in Augustus Barnett in 
relation to paragraph (c} will not arise in relation to 
paragraphs (a) and (b). The reason is that the offences 
77. 
in the latter two paragraphs are restricted to, or 
only apply in relation to, officers of the company, 
whereas paragraph (c) applies to any person who may 
have been carrying on the company's business, or been 
a party to it. Hence, if the charge in Augustus Barnett 
had been one of negligent or reckless trading, Rumasa, 
not being an officer of the company, could not have 
been made liable. 
The term 'officer' includes a director, manager or 
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secretary of the company. In most cases the officers 
will in fact be contracting debts on behalf of the 
company or carrying on the business of the company. 
Their liability, therefore, will usually be direct in 
that they themselves would have been negligent or 
reckless or fraudulent in conducting the company's 
affairs, rather than indirectly as parties to such 
conduct. The latter was the case in Gerald Cooper, 
where the respondent was not an officer but a creditor 
of the company in liquidation, and hence an outsider. 
Notwithstanding that general position, there may be 
cases where an officer may not be involved in the day 
to day activities of the company's business and would 
not, therefore, be directly engaged in carrying on the 
business of the company or contracting a debt on behalf 
of the company. Such might be the case, for example, 
78. 
where the company's accountant holds a nominal position 
as the company secretary (and thus becomes an officer) 
but is involved in the company's business to no greater 
extent than in his capacity as auditor and, from time 
t t . f. 
. 1 d . 16 7 o ime, as inancia a visor. Suppose that the 
company becomes insolvent and the directors, not being 
entirely clear about the company's financial position, 
ask the accountant whether they should continue trading 
and whether they could incur a particular debt. The 
accountant's advice is to continue trading and to 
incur the debt. It may be assumed that in doing so he 
acted recklessly and negligently. The company soon 
goes into liquidation and the liquidator begins 
proceedings against the accountant on the basis that, 
being an officer, he was party to reckless and negligent 
trading. The liquidator does not begin proceedings 
against the directors. 
It is submitted that in such a case, in respect of 
the reckless trading charge the Augustus Barnett 
decision would apply mutas mutandis, but that in respect 
of the negligent trading charge that decision would have 
no application. This follows from the difference in 
phraseology between paragraphs (a) and (b). The 
language of paragraph (b) is similar to that of 
paragraph (c). Following the Augustus Barnett approach, 
it is clear that there must have been the carrying on of 
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a business by someone, and it must have been done 
so recklessly. And just as under paragraph (c) it 
is irrelevant whether the respondent had an intention 
to defraud, so under paragraph (b) it would be 
irrelevant whether the respondent had foresight of 
the consequences (applying the subjective test) or 
should have been aware of the possibility of serious 
168 loss (the Thompson v Innes test). The words 'in a 
reckless manner' in paragraph (b) must refer back to 
the phrase 'carrying on of any business of the company' 
rather than to 'any person was ... knowingly a party to'. 
The Augustus Barnett approach does not, however, lend 
itself to paragraph (a). The relevant part of 
paragraph (a) is 'knowingly a party to the contracting 
of a debt by the company and did not, at the time the 
debt was contracted, honestly believe on reasonable 
grounds [that the debt would be paid.]'. Although 
there must be the contracting of a debt by the company 
(through the agency of its officers) paragraph (a) 
does not go on to provide that the debt must have been 
contracted negligently. This contrasts with the 
position under paragraphs (b) and (c), where the business 
must have been carried on recklessly or fraudulently. 
Further, negligence on the part of those actually 
contracting the debt is not a prerequisite to imposing 
liability on the respondent as a party. This again 
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contrasts with the position under paragraphs (b) and 
(c) where recklessness and fraud on the part of those 
carrying on the business is a prerequisite to imposing 
liability on the respondent. 
The above conclusion in respect of paragraph (a) 
follows from the language of that paragraph. The use 
of the word 'and' relates the words 'honestly believe 
on reasonable grounds' back to the words 'any person 
was ... knowingly a party to'. This means that the 
state of mind of the respondent is a relevant consideration 
to establish liability under paragraph (a), therefore, 
it must be shown that the respondent himself either did 
not hold an honest belief, or that he held an honest 
belief but on unreasonable grounds. 
The different conclusions reached in respect of 
paragraph (a) on the one hand and paragraphs (b) and 
(c) on the other hand inevitably follows from the 
different phraseology of those two sets of provisions. 
The decision in Augustus Barnett in relation to 
paragraph (c) was, it is respectfully submitted, clearly 
correct, and the extension of that decision to 
paragraph (b) is also clearly unavoidable given the 
similar language of those two provisions. It is submitted 
that the differences in position as between the two sets 
of paragraphs should be seen as an anomaly, and should 
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be rectified. The proper remedy, it is s
ubmitted, 
is to amend paragraph (a) so as to bring 
it into line 
with paragraphs (b) and (c). The positio
n in principle 
should be as stated in Augustus Barnett v
iz. that before 
a person can be held liable as a party to
 improper 
trading, there should in fact have been im
proper trading 
by those actually carrying on the busines
s of the 
company. 
Definition of 'party to' at present 
For the moment, however, the combined eff
ect of 
Maidstone, Gerald Cooper and Augustus Bar
nett upon the 
definition of 'party to' in section 320 m
ay be summarised 
as follows. To establish liability under
 paragraph (a) 
it must be shown that: 
(i) there was a positive act. 
(ii) there was the contracting of a deb
t 
by the company. 
(iii) the respondent did not honest
ly believe 
on reasonable grounds that the debt would
 
be paid. 
It follows from (i~i) that the respondent h
ad knowledge 
of the contracting of the debt. It need 
not be 
established that the debt was contracted 
negligently 
by the company. 
82. 
To establish liability under paragraphs (b) and 
(c) it must be shown that: 
(i) there was a positive act. 
(ii) the respondent knew that the business 
(iii) 
was being carried on recklessly/fraudulently. 
the persons carrying on the business of the 
company were in fact doing so recklessly/ 
fraudulently. 
In the absence of (iii) the foresight/intention of the 
respondent is irrelevant. 
Knowingly 
Section 320(1) provides that a person is only liable 
for carrying on business negligently, recklessly or 
fraudulently, or is only liable for being a party to 
the carrying on of such business, if he does so 
'knowingly'. The meaning of that term in the context 
of section 320(1) is a matter of some doubt, and the 
term may, in fact, be redundant. 
Prima facie 'knowingly' imports the element of mens rea 
and gives all the tests in the section a subjective 
element. But in In re J.E. Hurdley and Son Ltd
169 
the 
Court of Appeal, considering a predecessor of section 364 
of the Companies Act 1955
170 , which is not materially 
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different from section 320(1) on this point, held 
otherwise. The effect of the word 'knowingly' 
in section 364 was explained by Myers CJ as follows: 
"[All] that it means is that, before an 
order can be made [under section 364(1)] 
it must be shown that the member of the 
company sought to be mulcted knew that 
the particular debts were being incurred 
and also had knowledge generally of the 
company's affairs, so that, as a 
reasonable person, he should have known 
that, at the time the particular debts 
were being contracted, the company could 
not have had any reasonable or probable 
expectation of being able to pay the 171 
same as well as all its other debts." 
Two points arise out of this definition. First it must 
be proved that the respondent knew that the particular 
improper act was taking place. But this requirement 
is in fact simply a restatement of the 'knowledge' 
element in the definition of 'party to' discussed above. 
The second requirement, however, is a slightly different 
one; the respondent must also have had a knowledge 
11 f h I ff • 172 genera yo t e company s a airs. Generally a 
person carrying on the company's business would have 
knowledge of the company's affairs. The second 
requirement would, therefore, probably only apply to 
someone who is charged as a party to negligent, reckless 
or fraudulent trading; such a person may not necessarily 
have a general knowledge of the company's affairs, 
although he must, by virtue of the definition of 'party 
to', have knowledge of the particular transaction or 
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business which is sought to be impugned. If the 
Hurdleyinterpretation of 'knowingly' is accepted 
. 1 t' . 320 173 h · · in re a ion to section ten it is submitted 
that it does no more than qualify the definition of 
'party to' in the manner stated above. It is further 
submitted that, following Hurdley, 'knowingly ' should 
not be seen as importing the element of mens rea into 
section 320. That means that the tests in respect of 
the three grounds of liability in section 320(1) are 
as discussed previously. 
Carrying On of Any Business of the Company 
While there is no case on the meaning of 'knowingly' 
as it appears in section 320(1), a number of cases 
have considered the meaning of the phrase "carrying on 
of any business of a company". 
Single transaction 
Two of the issues which arise out of that expression 
h . l d 174 were considered in Re Gerald Cooper C emica s Lt. 
One of the arguments of the respondents in that case 
was that the principal company (now in liquidation) had 
not, by accepting the advance payment order from the 
applicants, done anything which could amount to a 
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'carrying on of the business of the company'. The 
respondents argued that the advance payment order was 
a single transaction and on the authority of 
In re Murray Watson Ltd175 could not constitute a 
carrying on of business. 
In Murray Watson Oliver J, referring to the United 
Kingdom equivalent of section 320, said that the section 
was 
"aimed at the carrying on of a business 
... and not at the execution of 
individual transactions in the course 
of carrying on that business. I do not 
think that the words "carried on" can 
be treated as synonymous with "carried 
out", nor can I read the words "any 
business" as synonymous with "any 
transaction or dealing". 11 176 
The respondents in Gerald Cooper prima facie had a 
strong argument. While the company's acts may have 
amounted to fraud, they may not have amounted to 
fraudulent trading in the sense of carrying on business. 
But Templeman J rejected that argument. He purported 
to rely on a passage from the judgment of Oliver J 
where, immediately after the passage quoted above, 
Oliver J had said: 
"The director of a company dealing 
in second-hand motor cars who wilfully 
misrepresents the age and capabilities 
of a vehicle is, no doubt, a 
fraudulent rascal, but I do not think 
he can be said to be carrying on the 
company's business for a fraudulent 
purpose, although no doubt he carries 
out a particular business transaction 
in a fraudulent manner. 11 177 
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Templeman J interpreted this passage as stating that 
one of the elements in the definition of 'carrying on 
business' fraudulently was a loss to creditors. His 
Lordship said that in the example given by Oliver J 
there was no loss to creditors and hence the single 
transaction in that example could not amount to a 
carrying on of business. According to him, section 320 
was 
" contemplating a state of facts in 
which the intent of the person carrying 
on the business is that the consequence 
of carrying it on (whether because of 
the way it is carried on or for any 
other reason) will be that creditors 
will be defrauded ... 11 178 
It is submitted, with respect, that Oliver J quite 
unequivocally stated that a single transaction could 
not amount to carrying on of a business, irrespective 
of any question of loss to creditors. By introducing 
the element of loss to creditors, Templeman J is adding 
a gloss to Oliver J's definition which the latter clearly 
did not intend. It is submitted that the two definitions 
are irreconcilable. Templeman J drew a distinction 
between a fraud on a customer and a fraud on a creditor, 
and confined Oliver J's example to the former. This 
enabled him to conclude: 
"It does not matter for the purposes of 
[section 320] that only one creditor 
was defrauded, and by one transaction, 
provided that the transaction can 
properly be described as a fraud on a 
87. 
creditor perpetrated in the course 
of carrying on business. 11 179 
It is respectfully submitted that both Murray Watson 
and Gerald Cooper are unsatisfactory decisions. It 
is submitted, with respect, that a single transaction 
should amount to the carrying on of a business, and to 
that extent Murray Watson is wrongly decided and 
Gerald Cooper should be preferred. Secondly, it is 
submitted that the basis on which Templeman J sought 
to distinguish Murray Watson is unsatisfactory, and 
to that extent Templeman J's decision should not be 
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accepted. The distinction between a fraud on a 
customer and a fraud on a creditor drawn by Templeman J 
is incorrect for two reasons, which have been cogently 
stated as follows: 
"First, the section covers the carrying 
on of business 'for any fraudulent 
purpose'; this is surely wide enough to 
cover the purpose of defrauding 
customers as well as creditors. Secondly, 
acceptance of Templeman J's suggested 
interpretation would have the strange 
result that controllers of a company 
could procure it to carry on business 
fraudulently with complete impunity 
under the fraudulent trading provisions, 
provided they kept the business on a 
strictly cash basis. 11 181 
The intention behind the enactment of section 320 
originally was to prevent all manner of fraudulent 
trading and to bring perpetrators to account in a speedy 
. f h . 182 
manner through the procedural mechanism o t e section. 
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The customer-creditor distinction in Gerald Cooper 
is contrary to that intention. 
Cessation of trading 
One other aspect of the definition of 'carrying on of 
183 
any business of the company' arose in Re Scarflex Ltd. 
The respondent argued that once the company had passed 
the resolution to cease trading, its subsequent activities 
could not amount to a carrying on of business; the 
company had ceased trading and over the next two 
years was merely collecting and distributing its assets. 
Oliver J rejected that argument in these words: 
"[It cannot be said thatJ the expression 
'carrying on any business' in the section 
is necessarily synonymous with actively 
carrying on trade or that the collection 
of assets acquired in the course of 
business and the distribution of the 
proceeds of those assets in the 
discharge of business liabilities cannot 
constitute the carrying on of 'any 184 
business' for the purposes of the section." 
What must be looked at is not the passing of the 
resolution or the cessation of trading, but the nature 
of the company's activities subsequent to those events. 
Normally a company has outstanding debts to collect 
and to pay, and while it was engaged in pursuing the 
various rights and discharging its various obligations, 
it was still carrying on business within the meaning of 
section 320. It would appear that even if a formal 
89. 
resolution for voluntary winding up were passed, 
the company would still be carrying on business within 
the meaning of section 320, and it would not be until 
the actual presentation of the petition that it could 
b 
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The Scarflex approach is supported by certain comments 
of the Court of Appeal in Re Nimbus Trawling Co. Ltd.
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It was argued that the alleged fraudulent transactions 
were not carried on in the usual course of the company's 
trading business. It was argued that the sale of 
the trawler, the company's major asset, was a 
disposition of a capital asset which could not amount 
to a carrying on of business. That argument was 
accepted by Richardson J, who agreed that the business 
of the company - trawling for fish - had ceased and 
the sale of the trawler was merely the realisation of 
a capital asset quite independent of, and not incidental 
to, the company's previous business. Nor did it 
constitute a new business. Richardson J distinguished 
Scarflex on the basis that in that case there were a 
series of transactions, including the sale of revenue 
assets, over a two year period. A company which was 
still collecting trade debts, realising trading stock 
and paying off creditors could be said to be carrying 
on business. That was the position in Scarflex and it 
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would appear that Richardson J would have decided 
Scarflex as Oliver J did. 
But the majority of the Court of Appeal rejected the 
respondents' narrow interpretation of the section. 
Cooke P, referring to section 320, said: 
"The legislation is meant to protect 
creditors. If transactions of the 
company are in fact undertaken with 
the intention of defrauding creditors, 
it is difficult to suggest any reason 
why Parliament would have wished to 
insist on the fraud having occurred in 
the course of trade before the statutory 
remedy would be available. 11 187 
The President adopted the ordinary meaning of 'business' 
which he stated as "dealings and commercial activities.
11188 
That broad definition quite clearly covered the 
transaction in the instant case. A fortioriit covered 
the series of transactions over the two year period 
as occurred in Scarflex. It is further submitted that 
Cooke P's broad language covers the single transaction 
over a short period of time as occurred in Gerald Cooper. 
The advance payment order in that case was in relation 
to the very product the company was dealing in, and 
that clearly amounted to a commercial activity of the 
company. Further, as Cooke P expressly said in 
relation to section 320: 
" ... the provision covers any dealing 
or transaction of the company performed, 
carried out or conducted with the 189 
intention of defrauding creditors." 
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Somers J did not use language as wide as that used 
by Cooke P. However, he expressly agreed with the 
conclusion in Scarflex, since as in Scarflex, what 
had occurred on the facts before him was "a continuous 
course of active conduct in the collection and 
distribution of the business assets 1
119 O, as well as a 
discharge of debts. According to Somers J, a company 
does not have to operate in the normal commercial 
sense of trading for a profit before it can be said to 
be carrying on business; the getting in of assets, 
paying of creditors and discharging of staff were 
activities amounting to a carrying on of business. 
It is submitted, with respect, that the broad 
approach adopted in Scarflex and Nimbus is consonant 
with the intention behind the enactment of section 320. 
A company does not merely defraud creditors during 
the normal course of business. As the facts of Nimbus 
show, and as Prichard Jin the High Court recognised, 
the versatility of company directors must not be 
d . d 191
 un erestimate . 
92. 
PROCEDURAL ISSUES 
Introduction 
So far this paper has discussed the basis upon which 
liability under section 320(1) is incurred; the 
elements which have to be established before one can 
prove negligent, reckless or fraudulent trading. 
This part of the paper looks at some of the procedural 
issues involved in bringing an application pursuant 
to section 320 in the first place, and at the 
consequences of the success of any such application. 
Locus Standi 
Subsection (1) of section 320 restricts the potential 
applicants under that section to four classes of 
persons: the Official Assignee, the liquidator, a 
creditor and a contributory of the company. For 
practical purposes the Official Assignee and the 
liquidator may be treated as one. 
'Contributory' is defined by section 212(1) of the 
Companies Act 1955 essentially as "every person liable 
to contribute to the assets of the company in the event 
of its being wound up." But generally the term is used 
93. 
f h 
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to re er tote members of the company. One 
reason for giving members standing is this. The 
members will only have their capital returned if 
there is a surplus of assets over liabilities after 
all the creditors of the company have been satisfied. 
If, instead of the company, the directors are made 
personally liable for the debts of the company, then 
the members stand a better chance of receiving part, 
or all, of their investment back. In practise, however, 
there do not appear to be any reported cases of a 
contributory exercising his right pursuant to section 320. 
Undoubtedly, the persons primarily intended to be 
benefited by section 320 are the creditors.
193 
The 
liquidator occupies a fiduciary position in relation 
h 11 
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tote company as we as t e ere itors. n 
discharging his functions he has to keep the interests 
of both groups in mind. It may be that in the course 
of winding up he discovers an instance of, say, 
fraudulent trading in relation to a particular creditor. 
But, keeping in mind the interests of both the company 
and the other creditors, he may decide not to pursue 
those responsible because the proceedings cannot be 
afforded in monetary terms. He may perhaps conclude 
that the chances of proving liability are less than 
even and that it would be more prudent to distribute 
the funds available rather than risk losing more in a 
94. 
litigation which may prove unsuccessful. However, 
the particular creditor who was defrauded may wish 
to proceed against the delinquent director in any 
event. He is therefore given standing in a section 
which is, after all, creditor - protection legislation. 
That this was an appropriate measure is evidenced by 
the cases where the creditor, rather than the 
1
. . d . h 1 · 195 iqui ator, is t e app icant. 
While the desirability of such a position may not be 
doubted, the cases reveal that this position poses 
certain difficulties as well. The crucial question 
is whether the successful creditor in a section 320 
application may retain the sum recovered from the 
respondent as his own or whether that sum should 
become part of the general assets of the company 
under the administration of the liquidator and be 
distributed pari passu amongst all creditors. The 
problem may arise, for instance, in the case where 
prima facie only the applicant creditor has suffered 
a loss but during the course of the proceedings it 
transpires that other creditors have also suffered loss. 
That issue in turn gives rise to the even more basic 
issue of whether a court ought to prevent a creditor 
from making an application pursuant to section 320 if 
the liquidator wishes to make, or has made, an application. 
95. 
In other words, does the liquidator's application take 
precedence. 
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In Re Gerald Cooper Chemicals Ltd Templeman J 
suggested that the liquidator would be given preference. 
His Lordship directed the applicant creditor to ask the 
liquidator whether he wished to intervene, and whether 
he wished to argue that any sums recovered from the 
respondents should go to the company rather than to the 
applicant creditor. Earlier, Templeman J had said: 
11 An application by a creditor [under 
section 320] must be carefully 
regulated if injustice is not to result. 
The respondents to this summons must 
not be placed in double jeopardy by the 
possibility of further proceedings by 
the liquidator. 11 197 
Although Templeman J did not expressly indicate 
whether the liquidator would be made the substitute 
applicant if he did decide to intervene, his Lordship's 
approach is open to the interpretation that, all things 
being equal, that would be the case. However, such an 
interpretation would appear to be contrary to what was 
said by the English Court of Appeal in Re Cyona 
Distributors Ltd.
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In that case a company went into liquidation owing the 
Commissioners of Customs and Excise a large sum in 
unpaid taxes. The Commissioners sought an order 
pursuant to the United Kingdom equivalent of 
96. 
section 320(1) (c). They also instituted criminal 
proceedings against the respondents. The section 320 
application was not then proceeded with. When the 
criminal action came for trial the respondent paid the 
Commissioners most of what was owing. The liquidator 
then claimed that the amounts received by the 
Commissioners should go towards the general assets of 
the company. 
Lord Denning MR and Dankwerts LJ had no doubt that 
the Commissioners were entitled to exercise their 
rights pursuant to the section. While the liquidator 
did not attempt to substitute himself for the 
Commissioners as the sole applicant, it would appear 
that even if he had tried, he would not have been 
successful. Lord Denning said: 
"But no doubt the liquidator should 
always be made a party to the proceedings, 
so that the interests of the other 
creditors can be safeguarded. 11 199 
It is submitted that if the liquidator were to apply, 
he would simply be made a party to the creditor's 
application, and not replace the creditor as the sole 
applicant. Any suggestion in Gerald Cooper to the 
contrary, therefore, is, with respect, incorrect. This 
course of action will adequately protect the interests 
of other creditors while at the same time ensuring that 
the individual creditor's efforts in bringing an action, 
97. 
where the liquidator had previously refused, is not 
simply disregarded. 
Although the liquidator may be given notice of the 
application, he may not be ordered to become a party; 
there is no suggestion in either Gerald Cooper or in 
Cyona to that effect. The liquidator may, however, 
be estopped from instituting fresh proceedings later 
if he refuses to become a party when initially 
notified. In Gerald Cooper Templeman J said: 
"[The liquidator] should be informed 
[by the applicant] that if he does not 
choose to intervene now he will not be 
able successfully to institute 
[section 320] proceedings against the 
respondents in the future. 11 200 
It is submitted that this is not an unreasonable 
approach. While the interests of the creditors are 
important, the respondent must not be placed in double 
jeopardy. Nor should the particular creditor applying 
later be suddenly faced with a challenge by the 
liquidator. Upon any application by a creditor, the 
court may easily adjourn proceedings for an appropriate 
period to enable the liquidator to make an election as 
to whether he wishes to join the application or not. 
Generally he will be acting on the views of all the 
creditors, and if, after consulting them, a decision is 
taken not to intervene, then the application should 
proceed and the respondent should not later be faced with 
fresh proceedings. 
98. 
Before leaving the position of standing, it should be 
noted that an application pursuant to section 320 may 
only be brought once the company in question has 
actually gone into liquidation. This is apparent from 
the opening words of the section. 201 Hence if a 
creditor believes he has been the subject of improper 
conduct on the company's part, he cannot avail 
himself of section 320 unless he first winds the 
company up. His only remedy otherwise is to proceed 
by way of an ordinary proceeding in the courts. 
The Distribution of any Sums Recovered 
Perhaps a more important issue is whether a creditor 
who individually brings a section 320 application, and 
does so successfully, is entitled to personally retain 
any sums recovered from the respondent. Prima facie 
the answer is yes. But the position may be more 
difficult if the liquidator becomes a party to the 
creditor's application. 
In Cyona Dankwerts LJ stated his opinion in unequivocal 
terms: 
"The situation seems to me to be quite 
different where a creditor begins 
proceedings at his own expense under 
the section. The creditor should be 
entitled to his reward. I do not think 
that he is acting as a trustee for the 
general body of creditors. 11 202 
99. 
Although his Lordship did refer to the court's 
discretion in this matter, as provided for under 
section 320 itself, he did not place as much emphasis 
on it as Lord Denning did. Lord Denning agreed that 
in a creditor's application the creditor acted on his 
own account, free from any control by the liquidator. 
Hence he was in no way a trustee for the other creditors. 
To that extent the court would probably make an order 
in his favour rather than in favour of the liquidator. 
However, the court did have a discretion in the matter. 
Russell LJ disagreed; in his opinion the section 
required that any sums recovered accrue to the assets 
of the company for distribution to all creditors. 
It should be noted that their Lordship's opinions on 
this issue were obiter only. The Commissioner's 
appeal was unanimously upheld by the Court of Appeal 
on the basis that the sums received by the Commissioners 
were not received pursuant to the section 320 application 
(since it had not been proceeded with) but by way of a 
.. 1 d' 203 mitigation plea in the concurrent cr1m1na procee ings. 
However, it is submitted that Lord Denning's approach 
is the preferable one. Section 320 gives the court a 
wide discretion to determine in whose favour the order 
should be made, and if in more than one person's favour, 
in what proportions should the sums recovered be divided. 
100. 
The section provides that upon liability being 
established under any one of paragraphs (a), (b) or 
(c), the court may "declare that the person shall be 
responsible, without any limitation of liability, for 
all or any part of the debts and other liabilities of 
the company as the court may direct". Prima facie the 
phrase 'as the court may direct' refers back to the 
extent of the order that may be made. However, the 
Court of Appeal (including Russell LJ204 ) construed 
that phrase as referring to the persons in whose favour 
the order may be made. Assuming that that is the case, 
the court has a discretion, in Lord Denning's words, 
to do one of three things: 
" ... order the sum to go in discharge 
of the debt of any particular creditor; 
or that it shall go to a particular 
class of creditors, or to the liquidator 
so as to go into the general assets of 
the company 11 • 205 
It follows from this that if the application is by 
a single creditor, the court may make an order in his 
favour. If the liquidator decides to intervene and 
proves that all or an ascertained group of creditors 
have suffered loss, then an order in favour of those 
other creditors may also be made. It is submitted that 
such an approach is in accordance with the intention 
behind the legislation, which was to indemnify those 
creditors who were actually the victims of the directors' 
101. 
or officers' improper conduct. As Dixon CJ recognised 
. d' 206 in Har ie v Hanson , the purpose of the enactment 
"surely must have been to enable the court to remove 
the protection of the no liability system ... and to 
require [delinquent] directors to indemnify the 
creditors defrauded to any extent left to the discretion 
of the court.
11207 
However, Dixon CJ's words do not apply in the case where 
the applicant is the liquidator on his own. It will be 
recalled that in In re William C. Leitch Bros. Ltd
208 
the proceedings were instituted by the liquidator. An 
order against the respondent was made by Maugham J, 
but he left open the question of how the monies recovered, 
if any, should be applied. In a subsequent hearing 
Eve J held that all monies recovered should go towards 
the general assets of the company and be distributed 
amongst all the creditors of the company.
209 
Eve J's decision was dealt with in three different ways 
by the Court of Appeal in Cyona. Lord Denning MR sought 
to lay down a broad rule when he said that the court's 
discretion to direct the destination of any funds 
recovered included the case where the applicant was the 
liquidator, although in such a case the court would 
invariably make an order in favour of the general assets 
of the company. Eve J's decision, according to 
102. 
Lord Denning, was simply an example of that approach. 
It is submitted, with respect, that the Master of the 
Roll's approach is incorrect. His remarks were purely 
by way of dicta while Eve J's decision was given 
following arguments by counsel, and was in respect of 
the precise point in issue. Dankwerts LJ distinguished 
Leitch (No. 2) on the basis that the application there 
was by the liquidator; his Lordship therefore confined 
his dicta to the case of an application by a creditor. 
Russell LJ, on the other hand, agreed with Eve J's 
decision, and saw it as being of general application. 
It is submitted that, in light of the way Leitch (No. 2) 
was dealt with by the Court of Appea1
210 , it is open for 
a subsequent court to adopt one of three approaches. 
It may hold Leitch (No. 2) to be of general application 
(as Russell LJ did); it may draw a distinction between 
the case where the applicant was the liquidator and the 
case where the applicant was a creditor (as Dankwerts LJ 
did); or it may decline to follow Leitch (No. 2). It 
is submitted that the second alternative would result 
in an undesirable and unnecessary distinction. The 
issue is not in respect of who the applicant is, but in 
respect of whether the particular creditors who have 
suffered loss only should be compensated; who the 
applicant is is an irrelevant consideration. 
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It is submitted that the preferred alternative is in 
effect to adopt Lord Denning's approach, with the 
qualification that that would necessitate not following 
Leitch (No. 2) . 211 Section 320(1), as has been 
recognised, gives courts wide powers to make delinquent 
directors and officers personally liable to those whom 
they have caused loss. If a particular creditor, or 
a particular group of creditors, can be identified as 
having specifically suffered losses, then the court 
should make an order in their favour. That was the 
approach envisaged by the section. Where, however, 
there are difficulties in ascertaining which creditors 
in fact have suffered loss, and if such difficulties 
ld d 1 1 h f 
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wou un u y pro ong t e process o wining up , 
then no doubt it would be in the interests of all 
creditors if the court made an order in favour of the 
general assets of the company. This approach, it is 
submitted, makes it irrelevant whether the applicant is 
the liquidator or a creditor in the first place, and if 
the latter, whether the liquidator does in fact become 
a party to the application subsequently. 
Extent of the Order - Is Section 320 a Penal Provision 
The issue under this head is to what extent, following 
the establishment of liability under section 320(1), 
104. 
the court may make an order against the respondent. 
The section states that the court may declare that 
the person liable should be responsible "without any 
limitation of liability, for all or any of the debts 
and other liabilities of the company". 
Generally the court will be able to establish the 
extent of loss suffered by creditors and will accordingly 
be able to make an order for a specific sum. In some 
cases, however, when the application comes on for 
hearing, the quantum of loss may still be a question to 
be finalised. The issue then arises, as it did in 
In re William C. Leitch Bros. Ltd
213
, whether the court 
in such a case should make a general declaration rather 
than an order for a specific sum. In Leitch it was 
held that any order had to be for a specific sum. 
Maugham J pointed out that an order under section 320 
was, pursuant to subsection (4), deemed a final 
· h b k 1 ' 1 . 
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Judgment for the purposes oft e an ruptcy egis ation 
and formed the basis for possible bankruptcy proceedings 
against the respondent. His Lordship accordingly made 
an order for 6000 pounds, which was the debt due in 
respect of stock purchased during the period the company 
was trading fraudulently. It is respectfully submitted 
that this decision was correct, and the quantum of the 
order quite reasonable in the circumstances and clearly 
' ' I d' t' 215 within the courts iscre ion. 
105. 
Maugham J's conclusion follows from the phrase "all 
of the debts and other liabilities of the company". 
That phrase prima facie enables the court to make a 
delinquent director or officer personally liable even 
for those debts of the company which were contracted 
during the proper, bona fide period of trading. But 
the cases have not been at one on the meaning of the 
phrase. Some cases have said that the phrase makes 
section 320 a punitive or penal provision; other cases 
have given it a more restrictive interpretation. 
In Leitch Maugham J had no doubt about the meaning of 
the phrase. He said: 
"[Section 320] is in the nature of a 
punitive provision, and it is in the 
discretion of the court to make an order 
without limiting the order to the amount 
of the debts of those creditors proved 
to have been defrauded by the acts of 
the director in question, though no 
doubt the order would in general be so 
limited. 11 216 
It should be noted that in general Maugham J would not 
exercise the discretion to penalise, and in Leitch 
itself he did not do so. But he did not indicate what 
circumstances or factors would lead him to exercise the 
discretion. 
In Cyona Lord Denning MR added his authority 
to this interpretation when, referring to the order 
that may be made, he said: 
"The sum may be compensatory. Or 
it may be punitive. 11 217 
106. 
The position, however, is not entirely settled. In 
Re Maney and Sons De Luxe Service Station Ltd218 the 
New Zealand Court of Appeal cast doubt on the position 
as stated above. In doing so the court also disagreed 
with Myers CJ in Re J.E. Hurdley and Son Ltd 219 where 
the learned Chief Justice had relied upon Leitch in 
holding that a predecessor of section 364 of the 
Companies Act 1955 was a penal provision. In Maney 
North P, referring to the English authorities, said 
that their Lordships' opinions "meant no more than 
that the damages may be 'punitive' in the sense in which 
that word is used in actions to recover damages at 
220 conunon law". Turner J said that he was not persuaded 
by their Lordships' opinions and Haslam J dismissed 
them as being obiter. 
With respect, the opinion of the court in Maney was 
also clearly obiter. The issue in that case was the 
issue in respect of which the question of whether 
section 320 is a penal provision generally becomes 
important viz. whether the limitation period for a 
. . 221 C l section 320 proceeding is two or six years. ounse 
in Maney proceeded upon the basis that section 320 was 
not a penal provision and the limitation period was 
accordingly six years. It was, therefore, strictly 
unnecessary for the court to discuss the issue. 
107. 
The Court of Appeal referred to the fact that Myers CJ's 
endorsement of the English position was a minority 
opinion. However, the issue in Hurdley was not in 
relation to section 320, but in relation to section 364. 
h 
. . . 222 Te maJor1ty in Hurd~ held that section 364 was 
not a penal provision; they did not, however, express 
any opinion about section 320. It is submitted that 
the Court of Appeal could have, and should have, 
distinguished Hurdley on the basis that the court's 
discretion to make an order under section 364 is 
expressed in different terms from the court's discretion 
under section 320. 
Section 364 states that if a member of a company acts 
or omits to act in a certain way then: 
"the court may, if it finds that the 
act or omission has in fact prejudiced 
the creditors or any creditor of the 
company, order any such member to pay 
to the liquidator of the company such 
sum in addition to the amount for 
which he may be liable under the 
constitution of the company as to the 
court may seem just." 
This section may be distinguished from section 320 on 
two grounds: the incurring of liability, and the extent 
of liability. 
The first ground is based specifically on the phrase 
'the act or omission has in fact prejudiced the creditors'. 
The majority of the Court of Appeal in Hurdley placed 
108. 
much emphasis on this phrase. Ostler J said: 
"It is to be noted that no action will 
lie against the directors ... 
notwithstanding that they have done 
the prohibited actions unless and until 
such actions have caused prejudice to 
one or more creditors. 11 223 
There must be a causal relationship between the member's 
improper act and the creditor's loss before the former 
may be held liable at all. If the member has acted 
improperly but it cannot be shown that such acts led 
to any losses on the part of the creditor, then liability 
is not established. 
The phrase in question does not, however, appear in 
section 320. There is no suggestion at all that a 
causal link between the respondent's improper acts and 
the creditor's loss is a prerequisite to imposing 
liability. On the contrary, it has been held
224 
that 
a director who participated in a fraudulent transaction 
but whose acts did not in fact cause any loss to 
creditors was liable for fraudulent trading. Liability 
under section 320, unlike that under section 364, does 
not, therefore, depend on the fact of loss to creditors 
due to improper trading; it depends upon whether the 
respondent has acted in an improper manner. 
h . 1 · bl 225 e 1.s 1.a e. 
If he has, 
The second ground of difference between sections 320 and 
109. 
364 follows from the first. Assuming that the 
respondent is in fact liable, the next issue is as 
to the extent of his liability. The language of 
section 364 is, in relation to this issue, in fact 
somewhat ambiguous. The section may be interpreted 
as giving the courts a discretion to impose liability 
to any extent they see fit, or it may be interpreted 
as restricting the courts' powers to imposing liability 
up to, but not exceeding, the actual loss suffered by 
creditors as a consequence of the member's improper 
acts. In Hurdley the majority of the Court of Appeal 
adopted the latter interpretation. Fair J said: 
"However grave the misconduct of the 
officer, the amount of the order must, 
I think, be limited to the extent to 
which the creditors are proved in fact 
to have been prejudiced. 11 226 
Consequently, section 364 was held to be a merely 
compensatory, as opposed to punitive, provision. 
That position must be compared with the position under 
section 320, where no ambiguities in relation to the 
issue of the extent of the order exists. The position 
is quite clear; the court may make an order in respect 
of "all ... of the debts or other liabilities of the 
company". The amount payable by the delinquents here 
is not limited to the amount of the loss suffered by 
creditors, but extends to all the debts and liabilities 
of the company, whether incurred during the period of 
110. 
improper trading or not. If the court's order is 
limited to the debts incurred during the period of 
improper trading, then it may be termed compensatory; 
if the order extends to debts incurred outside that 
period, then it may be termed punitive.
227 
It is submitted that the decision in Maney does not 
necessarily settle the issue of whether section 320 is 
a penal provision. As noted above, the court's 
comments were obiter only. Further, a recent High Court 
decision adopted the Leitch approach as correctly 
stating the law. 228 It is true that the actual 
decision in Maney in respect of the period of limitation 
for section 320 proceedings is in favour of the creditor. 
However, it is submitted that when one examines 
section 320 in detail, and compares it with section 364, 
one may conclude that section 320 is in the nature of a 
penal provision. 
Such a conclusion would appear to be 
' ' . . b h ' d h t ' 
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within the intention e in t e sec ion. 
Enforcement Provisions of Section 320 
One difficult and time consuming problem which 
successful litigants often face is the enforcement of 
judgments against the unsuccessful parties. 
In the 
context of a section 320 application, if one bears in 
111. 
mind the type of improper activity the section was 
originally primarily directed against, the problem may 
sometimes prove more difficult than usual. 
It is no use making a director or other officer of the 
company personally liable if one cannot in fact obtain 
from him within a reasonable period of time the sum for 
which judgment has been entered against him. The 
section 320 procedure was intended to be a relatively 
expedient one. In accordance with that object, the 
Greene Committee recommended
230 , and Parliament accepted, 
that the liability of the director be made a charge on 
any debt due from the company to him. This recommendation 
was directed in particular to the prevalent practice of 
the time whereby directors 'filled up' their debentures 
before putting their insolvent companies into liquidation. 
The Greene Committee's recommendation, now enacted as 
section 320(2) meant that the director could no longer 
take the benefit of the debenture. Instead, the assets 
over which the debenture was held in effect became 
available for the benefit of creditors (and contributories). 
Subsection (2), in fact, is expressed in very wide 
terms; where the court makes a declaration against the 
director "it may give such further directions as it 
thinks proper for the purpose of giving effect to that 
declaration ... ". The court has the power to charge the 
debenture even if it has been transferred to a third 
112. 
party, unless it was to "an assignee for valuable 
consideration ... given in good faith and without notice 
of any of the matters on the ground of which the 
declaration is made." The courts have utilised their 
power under subsection (2) and the provision would 
appear to be a useful enforcement mechanism in practice. 231 
Subsection (4) of section 320 further provides that a 
declaration under subsection (1) is deemed to be a final 
judgment within the meaning of section 19(d) of the 
Insolvency Act 1967. This enables the applicant (as 
judgment creditor) to commence bankruptcy proceedings 
against the respondent (now the judgement debtor) if the 
latter does not, or is unable to, discharge the liability. 
Mention has already been made of the criminal penalties 
associated with section 320. Prior to the passing of the 
Companies Amendment Act 1980 they were contained in 
subsection (3) of section 320; they are now to be found in 
section 4610. Two points may be noted about section 4610. 
It only applies to a breach of section 320(1) (c); it does 
not apply to a breach of sections 320(1) (a) or (b). 
Secondly, the words "If in the course of the winding up of 
a company" in section 320(1) do not appear in section 4610. 
It has been held, however, in relation to the former 
section 320(3), that that provision only applied where the 
company was in fact being wound up~
32 
It is submitted that the repeal 
113. 
of section 320(3) and its re-enactment as section 461D 
makes no difference to that position; the change 
brought by the amendment is merely procedural, not 
substantive. 
Procedure for bringing Application under Section 320(1) 
The method of instituting proceedings under section 320(1) 
was until recently quite simple. Rule 49 of the 
Companies (Winding Up) Rules 1956 is the starting point. 
It states that all section 320(1) applications are to be 
made by motion to the court. 
Under the former Code of Civil Procedure the practice 
was to make an originating application pursuant to 
Part VI of the Code. But with the coming into force of 
the new High Court Rules the procedures have changed. 
The position is not entirely satisfactory because the 
Rules do not thoroughly deal with (inter alia) the 
question of proceedings under the Companies Act. Further 
procedures to reconcile the Companies Act procedures 
and the High Court Rules, particularly in relation to 
winding up, are still under consideration. For present 
purposes, however, the procedure is that contained in 
Part IV of the High Court Rules. By rule 448(1) (c) the 
Companies Act falls to be dealt with under Part IV. That 
114. 
Part abolishes the former originating applications 
procedure and introduces instead a uniform originating 
process by way of statement of claim and notice of 
d . 233 procee ing. There would also normally be filed an 
affidavit in support. 
Rule 49(2) of the Winding Up Rules requires the 
application to be on notice. The notice is to be 
served on the respondent not less than eight days before 
the hearing. Any affidavits and reports intended to be 
used in support are to be served at least four days 
before the hearing. Where the applicant is not certain 
as to who exactly should be served, he may, pursuant to 
rule 451 of the High Court Rules, apply to the court for 
directions. Normally this would be done as a matter of 
course. Pursuant to rule 455 evidence is given either 
by means of a statement of facts as agreed to by the 
parties, or by means of affidavits. In the latter case 
either party may, pursuant to rule 508, cross-examine 
witnesses. Generally the court has a discretion as to 
the procedures involved, and will usually act so as to 
make the proceedings acceptable and expedient for all 
parties involved. 
115. 
CONCLUSIOU 
Section 320 is, without doubt, a complex section. 
The various inter-relationships between the different 
parts of the section are not always easy to establish 
or construe. Part of the difficulty arises from the 
rather obscure structure of the section; and that 
situation has not been helped by the lack of any 
comprehensive global judicial consideration of the 
section.
234 
All the cases deal with particular aspects 
of the section only, without considering the relationship 
of that aspect with other aspects of the section. 
Professor Gower at least is in no doubt as to the 
efficacy of section 320. 235 However, one would, with 
respect, find it hard to support his view if one 
considers that there are relatively few reported 
decisions on the section in spite of the fact that it 
was first enacted almost sixty years ago. The section 
has been universally criticised (including in New Zealand, 
at least prior to its amendment in 1980) as imposing 
too high a standard of proof. But the enactment of 
paragraphs (a) and (b) of section 320(1) in 1980 does 
not appear to have made any difference to the position. 
It has been argued 236 that the difficulty with 
section 320 is not, and never has been, one in relation 
116. 
to the question of the standard of proof, but rather 
one in relation to the question of enforcement. The 
problem, it is argued, lies in the high costs involved 
in instituting and completing proceedings against 
delinquent directors and other officers. On the one 
hand the assets of the company may not be adequate 
to cover the cost of proceedings, and on the other 
hand the respondent "may have made arrangements against 
th • 11 237 at contingency. It is accordingly argued that 
the remedy lies not in broadening the scope of 
section 320 (as New Zealand has done) but in 
establishing a fighting fund for creditors to bring 
into account those behind the many 'fly-by-night' 
companies who, according to one article 238 , defraud 
innocent members of the public in New Zealand of about 
$100 million each year. The options suggested include 
a legal aid fund established and maintained by 
increased charges at the Companies Office; the setting 
aside of a proportion of all secured creditors' claims; 
and the abolition of the concept of an order of priority 
upon a winding up, and in particular of the Revenue's 
privileged position. 
The arguments referred to above would appear to have 
support in New Zealand. The Head of the Justice 
Department's Corporate Fraud Unit has been reported as 
confirming that the major problem in bringing fraudulent 
117. 
company directors to account was the high cost of 
d . 239 procee ings. And the Minister of Justice has been 
reported as suggesting the implementation of a 
"suitors fund": 
"The source of such funds could be 
unclaimed dividends on the introduction 
of a reserve liability so that 
shareholders contribute to the cost of 
the liquidator's proceedings. 11 240 
It is unlikely, however, that any particular measures 
will be implemented in the near future. For the 
moment creditors will have to continue relying on 
section 320 (and the related creditor-protection 
provisions in the Companies Act 1955) and their own 
resources and determination to safeguard their 
interests. They have the support of the courts; in 
recent decisions 241 the courts have indicated that 
they are prepared to give section 320 a wide and liberal 
interpretation so as to give effect to the intention 
behind the section. 
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APPENDIX 
Companies Act 1955, section 320 
Responsibility for fraudulent trading of persons 
concerned (1) If in the course of the winding 
up of a company it appears that-
(a) Any person was, while an officer of the 
company, knowingly a party to the 
contr~cting of a debt by the company 
and did not, at the time the debt was 
contracted, honestly believe on 
reasonable grounds that the company 
would be able to pay the debt when it 
fell due for payment as well as all 
its other debts, (including future 
and contingent debts); or 
(b) Any person was, while an officer of the 
company, knowingly a party to the 
carrying on of any business of the 
company in a reckless manner; or 
(c) Any person was knowingly a party to the 
carrying on of any business of the 
company with intent to defraud 
creditors of the company or creditors 
of any other person or for any 
fraudulent purpose,-
the Court, on the application of the Official Assignee 
or the liquidator or any creditor or contributory of 
the company, may, if it thinks it proper to do so, 
declare that the person shall be personally responsible, 
without any limitation of liability, for all or any 
part of the debts and other liabilities of the company 
as the Court may direct. On the hearing of an 
application under this subsection the Official 
Assignee or the liquidator, as the case may be, may himself 
give evidence or call witnesses. 
(2) Where the Court makes any such declaration it 
may give such further directions as it thinks proper 
for the purpose of giving effect to that declaration, 
and, in particular, may make provision for making the 
liability of any such person under the declaration a 
charge on any debt or obligation due from the company 
to him, or on any mortgage or charge or any interest 
in any mortgage or charge on any assets of the company 
held by or vested in him, or any company or person 
on his behalf, or any person claiming as assignee from 
or through the person liable or any company or person 
acting on his behalf, and may from time to time make 
such further order as may be necessary for the purpose 
of enforcing any charge imposed under this subsection. 
For the purpose of this subsection the expression 
"assignee" includes any person to whom or in whose 
favour, by the direclions of the person liable, the 
debt, obligation, mortgage, or charge was created, 
issued, or lransferred or the interest created, but 
does not include an assignee for valuable consideration 
(not including consideration by way of marriage) given 
in good faith and without notice of any of the matters 
on the ground of which the declaration is made. 
(3) Repealed bys. 32(2) of the Companies Amendment 
Act 1980. 
(4) The provisions of this section shall have 
effect noLwithstanding that the person concerned may 
be criminally liable in respect of the matters on the 
ground of which the declaration is to be made, and 
every declaration under subsection (1) of this section 
shall be deemed to be a final judgment within the 
meaning of paragraph (d) of section 19 of the Insolvency 
Act 1967. 
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